A Simple Solution to the Problem of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Choo and Siow Marriage Market Model
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- Kirsten Cornelson & Aloysius Siow, 2016.
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- Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
Independence of irrelevant alternatives; marriage market; transferable utility;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ECM-2019-09-09 (Econometrics)
- NEP-MIC-2019-09-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2019-09-09 (Operations Research)
- NEP-UPT-2019-09-09 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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