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The role of own-group density and local social norms for ethnic marital sorting: Evidence from the UK

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  • Anderberg, Dan
  • Vickery, Alexander

Abstract

We exploit the post-war immigration-induced regional variation in ethnic composition among British-born individuals to study inter-ethnic marriages in the UK. Black and Asian individuals are more likely to marry intra-ethnically in regions where the own ethnicity share is relatively large. In order to disentangle the relative roles played by supply effects, preferences and local social norms we estimate a structural marriage market model that allows for conformity behaviour. Using the estimated model, we make predictions for a set of more recent cohorts whose marital choices are still to be completed.

Suggested Citation

  • Anderberg, Dan & Vickery, Alexander, 2021. "The role of own-group density and local social norms for ethnic marital sorting: Evidence from the UK," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:138:y:2021:i:c:s0014292121001276
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103774
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriage; Ethnicity; Assortative matching; Conformity; Social norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • J11 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination

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