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Dynamic Marriage Matching: An Empirical Framework

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  • Eugene Choo

Abstract

This paper develops a new model for empirically analyzing dynamic matching in the marriage market and then applies that model to recent changes in the U.S. marriage distribution. Its primary objective is to estimate gains by age from being married today (till death of at least one spouse) relative to remaining single for that same time period. An empirical methodology that relies on the model's equilibrium outcomes identifies the marriage gains using a single cross‐section of observed aggregate matches. This behavioral dynamic model rationalizes a new marriage matching function. The model also solves the inverse problem of computing the vector of aggregate marriages, given a new distribution of available single individuals and estimated preferences. Finally, this paper develops a simple test of the model's empirical validity. Using aggregate data of new marriages and available single men and women in the United States over two decades from 1970 to 1990, I investigate the changes in marriage gains over this period.

Suggested Citation

  • Eugene Choo, 2015. "Dynamic Marriage Matching: An Empirical Framework," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(4), pages 1373-1423, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i:4:p:1373-1423
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    Cited by:

    1. Schürhoff, Norman & Hendershott, Terrence & Livdan, Dmitry & Li, Dan, 2017. "Relationship Trading in OTC Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 12472, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Sunha Myong & JungJae Park & Junjian Yi, 2021. "Social Norms and Fertility," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(5), pages 2429-2466.
    3. Li, Li & Mak, Eric, 2016. "Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage: The Catalyst Effect of Unilateral Divorce," MPRA Paper 83330, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Bisin, Alberto & Tura, Giulia, 2019. "Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration in Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Terrence Hendershott & Dan Li & Dmitry Livdan & Norman Schürhoff, 2020. "Relationship Trading in Over‐the‐Counter Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 683-734, April.
    6. Ismael Mourifié, 2019. "A marriage matching function with flexible spillover and substitution patterns," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(2), pages 421-461, March.
    7. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2017. "Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1507-1534, June.
    8. Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. & Wilkening, Tom, 2019. "Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 416-454.
    9. Qinyou Hu, 2024. "Social status and marriage markets: Evaluating a Hukou policy in China," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 477-509, June.
    10. Andrew Shephard, 2019. "Marriage market dynamics, gender, and the age gap," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Dan Anderberg & Jesper Bagger & V. Bhaskar & Tanya Wilson, 2019. "Marriage market equilibrium, qualifications, and ability," CESifo Working Paper Series 7570, CESifo.
    12. Miguel Olivo-Villabrille, 2022. "The marital earnings premium: an IV approach," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 709-747, February.
    13. Alberto Bisin & Giulia Tura, 2019. "Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Italy," Working Papers 2019-063, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    14. Gutierrez, Federico H., 2020. "A simple solution to the problem of independence of irrelevant alternatives in Choo and Siow marriage market model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    15. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    16. Edoardo Ciscato, 2019. "Matching models with and without frictions : applications to the economics of the family [Modèles d'appariement avec et sans frictions : applications à l'économie de la famille]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03411916, HAL.
    17. Keisuke Kawata & Mizuki Komura, 2023. "Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market," Papers 2307.15336, arXiv.org.
    18. Edoardo Ciscato, 2019. "Matching models with and without frictions : applications to the economics of the family [Modèles d'appariement avec et sans frictions : applications à l'économie de la famille]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03411916, HAL.
    19. Adda, Jérôme & Pinotti, Paolo & Tura, Giulia, 2020. "There's More to Marriage than Love: The Effect of Legal Status and Cultural Distance on Intermarriages and Separations," CEPR Discussion Papers 14432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Anderberg, Dan & Vickery, Alexander, 2021. "The role of own-group density and local social norms for ethnic marital sorting: Evidence from the UK," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    21. Gutierrez, Federico H., 2019. "A Simple Solution to the Problem of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Choo and Siow Marriage Market Model," GLO Discussion Paper Series 387, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    22. Dan Anderberg & Jesper Bagger & V. Bhaskar & Tanya Wilson, 2022. "Marriage market equilibrium with matching on latent ability: Identification using a compulsory schooling expansion," Working Papers 2022_11, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.

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