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Bargaining and the role of negotiators' competitiveness

Author

Listed:
  • Keser, Claudia
  • Müller, Stephan
  • Peterlé, Emmanuel
  • Rau, Holger A.

Abstract

This paper experimentally tests the relation between subjects' competitiveness and bargaining behavior. Bargaining is investigated in a demand-ultimatum game, where the responder can request a share of the pie from the proposer. The results show that highly competitive proposers earn less, since they make lower offers, which are more often rejected. Similarly, highly competitive responders achieve lower payoffs, since they request excessive amounts which induces lower proposals. These findings establish a link between competitiveness and bargaining as suggested by social and evolutionary psychology. Thus, we identify one driver of the empirical heterogeneity of bargaining behavior and outcomes. From a management perspective our findings highlight that giving thought to employees' competitiveness before delegating them to participate in negotiations may pay off.

Suggested Citation

  • Keser, Claudia & Müller, Stephan & Peterlé, Emmanuel & Rau, Holger A., 2018. "Bargaining and the role of negotiators' competitiveness," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 341, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:341
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    1. Asad Islam & Sakiba Tasneem & Liang Choon Wang, 2023. "Fishermen’s competitiveness and labour market performance: Evidence from shrimpers in Bangladesh," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 67(3), pages 346-363, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Competitiveness; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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