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Wage Offers and On-the-job Search

Author

Listed:
  • Potter, Tristan

    (Drexel University)

  • Bernhardt, Dan

    (University of Illinois & University of Warwick)

Abstract

We study the wage-setting problem of an employer with private information about demand for its product when workers can engage in costly on-the-job search. Employers understand that low wage offers may convey bad news that induces workers to search. The unique perfect sequential equilibrium wage strategy is characterized by : (i) pooling by intermediate-revenue employers on a common wage that just deters search; (ii) discontinuously lower revealing offers by low-revenue employers for whom the benefit of deterring search fails to warrant the required high pooling wage; and (iii) high revealing offers by high-revenue employers seeking to deter aggressive raiders

Suggested Citation

  • Potter, Tristan & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Wage Offers and On-the-job Search," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1201, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1201
    as

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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2019/twerp_1201_bernhardt.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. Jason Faberman & Andreas I. Mueller & Ayşegül Şahin & Giorgio Topa, 2022. "Job Search Behavior Among the Employed and Non‐Employed," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1743-1779, July.
    2. Peter Gottschalk, 2005. "Downward Nominal-Wage Flexibility: Real or Measurement Error?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 556-568, August.
    3. Scoones, David & Bernhardt, Dan, 1998. "Promotion, Turnover, and Discretionary Human Capital Acquisition," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 122-141, January.
    4. George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919.
    5. Erica L. Groshen, 1991. "Sources of Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion: How Much Do Employers Matter?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(3), pages 869-884.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wage offers ; on-the-job search ; signaling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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