IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpgt/0502040.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Predicting The Outcome of Marketing Negotiations: Role-Playing versus Unaided Opinions

Author

Listed:
  • JS Armstrong

    (The Wharton School)

  • Philip D. Hutcherson

    (Beckman Instruments)

Abstract

Role -playing and unaided opinions were used to forecast the outcome of three negotiations. Consistent with prior re search, role-playing yielded more accurate predictions. In two studies on marketing negotiations, the predictions based on role-playing were correct for 53% of the predictions while unaided opinions were correct for only 7% (p

Suggested Citation

  • JS Armstrong & Philip D. Hutcherson, 2005. "Predicting The Outcome of Marketing Negotiations: Role-Playing versus Unaided Opinions," General Economics and Teaching 0502040, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0502040
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/get/papers/0502/0502040.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carroll, John S. & Bazerman, Max H. & Maury, Robin, 1988. "Negotiator cognitions: A descriptive approach to negotiators' understanding of their opponents," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 352-370, June.
    2. JS Armstrong, 2004. "Forecasting Methods for Conflict Situations," General Economics and Teaching 0412025, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. JS Armstrong, 2004. "Forecasting for Environmental Decision Making," General Economics and Teaching 0412023, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ellen Garbarino & Robert Slonim, 2007. "Preferences and decision errors in the winner’s curse," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 241-257, June.
    2. Carroll, John S., 1948-, 1990. "Improving negotiators' cognitions," Working papers 3116-90., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    3. Jennifer J. Halpern, 1997. "Elements of a Script for Friendship in Transactions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(6), pages 835-868, December.
    4. Gary Charness & Dan Levin, 2009. "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 207-236, February.
    5. Elanor F. Williams & Alicea Lieberman & On Amir, 2021. "Perspective neglect: Inadequate perspective taking limits coordination," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(4), pages 898-931, July.
    6. Messick, David M. & Moore, Don A. & Bazerman, Max H., 1997. "Ultimatum Bargaining with a Group: Underestimating the Importance of the Decision Rule," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 87-101, February.
    7. Christina Fang & Sari Carp & Zur Shapira, 2011. "Prior Divergence: Do Researchers and Participants Share the Same Prior Probability Distributions?," Discussion Paper Series dp587, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    8. Dolly Chugh & Max Bazerman, 2007. "Bounded awareness: what you fail to see can hurt you," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 6(1), pages 1-18, June.
    9. Xavier Gabaix, 2017. "Behavioral Inattention," NBER Working Papers 24096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. JS Armstrong, 2004. "Forecasting for Environmental Decision Making," General Economics and Teaching 0412023, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Gary Bornstein & Danny Mingelgrin & Christel Rutte, 1996. "The Effects of Within-Group Communication on Group Decision and Individual Choice in the Assurance and Chicken Team Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 486-501, September.
    12. Gary Bornstein & Zohar Gilula, 2003. "Between-Group Communication and Conflict Resolution in Assurance and Chicken Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(3), pages 326-339, June.
    13. Guarino, Antonio & Huck, Steffen & Jeitschko, Thomas D., 2006. "Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 264-285, November.
    14. Iris Bohnet & Stephan Meier, 2005. "Deciding to distrust," Public Policy Discussion Paper 05-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    15. Van Poucke, Dirk & Buelens, Marc, 2002. "Predicting the outcome of a two-party price negotiation: Contribution of reservation price, aspiration price and opening offer," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 67-76, February.
    16. Gunther Tichy, 2002. "Over-optimism Among Experts in Assessment and Foresight," ITA manu:scripts 02_05, Institute of Technology Assessment (ITA).
    17. J. S. Armstrong & R. Brodie & S. McIntyre, 2005. "Forecasting Methods for Marketing:* Review of Empirical Research," General Economics and Teaching 0502023, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Nelson Lau & Yakov Bart & J. Neil Bearden & Ilia Tsetlin, 2014. "Exploding Offers Can Blow Up in More Than One Way," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 11(3), pages 171-188, September.
    19. Daniels, David P. & Neale, Margaret A. & Greer, Lindred L., 2017. "Spillover bias in diversity judgment," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 92-105.
    20. Gary Bornstein & Zohar Gilula, 2002. "The effect of between-group communication on conflict resolution in the Assurance and Chicken team games," Discussion Paper Series dp296, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    predicting; negotiations; marketing; role-playing; unaided opinion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A - General Economics and Teaching

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0502040. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.