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Improving negotiators' cognitions

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  • Carroll, John S., 1948-

Abstract

Includes bibliographical references (p. 33-36).

Suggested Citation

  • Carroll, John S., 1948-, 1990. "Improving negotiators' cognitions," Working papers 3116-90., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:2293
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/2293
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bazerman, Max H. & Magliozzi, Thomas & Neale, Margaret A., 1985. "Integrative bargaining in a competitive market," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 294-313, June.
    2. Carnevale, Peter J. D. & Isen, Alice M., 1986. "The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-13, February.
    3. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-955, December.
    4. Carroll, John S. & Bazerman, Max H. & Maury, Robin, 1988. "Negotiator cognitions: A descriptive approach to negotiators' understanding of their opponents," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 352-370, June.
    5. Ball, Sheryl B. & Bazerman, Max H. & Carroll, John S., 1991. "An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-22, February.
    6. Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-272, March.
    7. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1986. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 894-920, December.
    8. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1979. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 623-638, September.
    9. John H. Kagel & Colin M. Campbell & Dan Levin, 1999. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 325-334, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

    HD28 .M414 no.3116-; 90;

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