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Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and Punishment Levels

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  • Saori Chiba

    (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice)

  • Kaiwen Leong

    (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University)

Abstract

Empirical studies have shown, paradoxically, that increasing the probability of apprehension can correlate with an increase in the total number of criminal actions. To examine this phenomenon, this paper develops a theory of "personal rules" based on the tradeoff between oneÕs self-image of criminal productivity and the temptation Ð salience of the present Ð of taking the easy way out by committing a crime. This theory analyzes transformation of lapses into precedents that undermine future self-restraint. The foundation for this transformation is imperfect recall of oneÕs own criminal productivity within certain defined parameters, which leads people to draw inaccurate inferences from their past actions. Rationalization may lead to overestimation of the expected utility of committing a crime when the opportunity presents itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2014. "Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and Punishment Levels," Working Papers 21, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    • Handle: RePEc:vnm:wpdman:92
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime; Imperfect Recall; Willpower.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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