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The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession

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  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter

Abstract

The paper extends and empirically tests Gordon Tullock's public choice theory of the nature of autocracy. A simple model of the relationship between constitutional rules governing succession in autocratic regimes and the occurrence of coups against autocrats is sketched. The model is applied to a case study of coups against monarchs in Denmark in the period ca. 935-1849. A clear connection is found between the specific constitutional rules governing succession and the frequency of coups. Specifically, the introduction of automatic hereditary succession in an autocracy provides stability and limits the number of coups conducted by contenders. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2000. "The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 63-84, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:103:y:2000:i:1-2:p:63-84
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    3. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    4. Anderson, Gary M & Boettke, Peter J, 1993. "Perestroika and Public Choice: The Economics of Autocratic Succession in a Rent-Seeking Society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 101-118, February.
    5. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. New paper on the political economy of monarchy
      by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard in Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard on 2014-04-23 19:00:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 245-278, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    2. Saurabh Pant, 2018. "Power-sharing ‘discontinuities’: Legitimacy, rivalry, and credibility," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 147-177, January.
    3. Vincenzo Bove & Roberto Nisticò, 2014. "Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 321-344, December.
    4. Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky, 2011. "Oil and the duration of dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 505-530, September.
    5. Yaguang Zhang & Sitian Yu & Shengyi Zhang, 2023. "The political economy of imperial power successions in ancient China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 137-166, October.
    6. Luisa Giuriato, 2009. "Combining Autocracy and Majority Voting: The Canonical Succession Rules of the Latin Church," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Mario Ferrero & Ronald Wintrobe (ed.), The Political Economy of Theocracy, chapter 6, pages 143-164, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Christian Bjørnskov, 2020. "Why do military dictatorships become presidential democracies? Mapping the democratic interests of autocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 21-43, October.
    8. Bruno Frey, 2011. "Tullock challenges: happiness, revolutions, and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 269-281, September.
    9. Benno Torgler & Bruno Frey, 2013. "Politicians: be killed or survive," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 357-386, July.
    10. Grigory V. Kalyagin & Vladimir A. Kozlov, 2012. "Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression," Working Papers 0001, Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics.
    11. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2012. "Modeling constitutional choice: reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 407-413, September.
    12. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2017. "Three comments on ”Gordon Tullock and the rational choice commitment”," MPRA Paper 83115, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Raul Magni Berton & Sophie Panel, 2017. "Strategic gerontocracy: why nondemocratic systems produce older leaders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(3), pages 409-427, June.
    14. George Tridimas, 2014. "Why some democracies are headed by a monarch?," ICER Working Papers 07-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    15. Alexander Baturo, 2007. "Presidential Succession and Democratic Transitions," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp209, IIIS.
    16. George Tridimas, 2021. "Constitutional monarchy as power sharing," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 431-461, December.
    17. Kai A. Konrad & Vai-Lam Mui, 2015. "The Prince – or better no prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor," Monash Economics Working Papers 15-15, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    18. Fernando Aragón, 2014. "Why do parties use primaries?: Political selection versus candidate incentives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 205-225, July.
    19. Salter, Alexander William, 2015. "Rights to the Realm: Reconsidering Western Political Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 725-734, November.

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