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Commissars and cars: A case study in the political economy of dictatorship

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  • Lazarev, Valery
  • Gregory, Paul

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  • Lazarev, Valery & Gregory, Paul, 2003. "Commissars and cars: A case study in the political economy of dictatorship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-19, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:31:y:2003:i:1:p:1-19
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    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Avner Offer, 1997. "Between the gift and the market: the economy of regard," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 50(3), pages 450-476, August.
    3. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February.
    4. George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
    5. Wallis, John Joseph, 1998. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending Revisited, Again: With and without Nevada," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 140-170, April.
    6. P. Lundborg, 1998. "Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 127-142, July.
    7. Alberto F. Ades & Edward L. Glaeser, 1995. "Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 195-227.
    8. Mancur Olson, Jr., 1995. "Why the Transition from Communism Is So Difficult," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 437-461, Fall.
    9. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-851, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2024. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 594-636, June.
    2. Lazarev, Valery, 2007. "Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 546-563, September.
    3. Markevich, Andrei & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2011. "M-form hierarchy with poorly-diversified divisions: A case of Khrushchev's reform in Soviet Russia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1550-1560.
    4. Andrei Markevich & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2009. "Career Concerns in a Political Hierarchy: A Case of Regional Leaders in Soviet Russia," Working Papers w0040, New Economic School (NES).
    5. Fabio Padovano & Ronald Wintrobe, 2013. "The Dictatorship of the Popes," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 365-377, August.
    6. Eugenia Belova & Valery Lazarev, 2007. "Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 437-456, March.
    7. Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," EconStor Preprints 142339, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    8. Andrei Markevich, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," Working Papers w0107, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    9. Grigory V. Kalyagin & Vladimir A. Kozlov, 2012. "Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression," Working Papers 0001, Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics.
    10. Mokhtari, Manouchehr & Grafova, Irina, 2007. "Corruption: Theory and evidence from the Russian Federation," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 412-422, December.
    11. Marina Dodlova, 2013. "Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bureaucracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4443, CESifo.
    12. Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "Essays on Real Business Cycle Modeling and the Public Sector," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 130522, January.

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