Commissars and cars: A case study in the political economy of dictatorship
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- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," NBER Working Papers 27949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2020. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 15344, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," Working Papers 2020-142, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
- Lazarev, Valery, 2007.
"Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 546-563, September.
- Lazarev, Valery, 2007. "Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime," MPRA Paper 2352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Markevich, Andrei & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2011.
"M-form hierarchy with poorly-diversified divisions: A case of Khrushchev's reform in Soviet Russia,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1550-1560.
- Andrei Markevich & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2011. "M-form hierarchy with poorly-diversified divisions: A case of Khrushchev's reform in Soviet Russia," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754499, HAL.
- Andrei Markevich & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2011. "M-form hierarchy with poorly-diversified divisions: A case of Khrushchev's reform in Soviet Russia," Post-Print halshs-00754499, HAL.
- Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina & Markevich, Andrei, 2011. "M-form hierarchy with poorly-diversified divisions: a case of Khrushchev?s reform in Soviet Russia," CEPR Discussion Papers 8221, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrei Markevich & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2009.
"Career Concerns in a Political Hierarchy: A Case of Regional Leaders in Soviet Russia,"
Working Papers
w0040, New Economic School (NES).
- Andrei Markevich & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2009. "Career Concerns in a Political Hierarchy: A Case of Regional Leaders in Soviet Russia," Working Papers w0040, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Fabio Padovano & Ronald Wintrobe, 2013.
"The Dictatorship of the Popes,"
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- Fabio Padovano & Ronald Wintrobe, 2013. "The Dictatorship of the Popes," Post-Print halshs-00846717, HAL.
- Eugenia Belova & Valery Lazarev, 2007. "Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 437-456, March.
- Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013.
"On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework,"
EconStor Preprints
142339, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Aleksandar Vasilev, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," Working Papers 2013_20, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-84, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Andrei Markevich, 2007.
"The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin,"
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w0107, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma : to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 816, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," Economic Research Papers 269765, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Andrei Markevich, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," Working Papers w0107, New Economic School (NES).
- Grigory V. Kalyagin & Vladimir A. Kozlov, 2012. "Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression," Working Papers 0001, Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics.
- Mokhtari, Manouchehr & Grafova, Irina, 2007. "Corruption: Theory and evidence from the Russian Federation," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 412-422, December.
- Marina Dodlova, 2013. "Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bureaucracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4443, CESifo.
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