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Formalizing clientelism in Kenya: From Harambee to the Constituency Development Fund

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  • Ken Ochieng' Opalo

Abstract

Why does clientelism persist? What determines how politicians signal responsiveness or fulfil their campaign promises? Existing works assume that politicians choose the most successful means of winning votes—either through targeted patronage/clientelism or programmatic policies. However, the empirical record shows high levels of persistence of the nature of the relationship between voters and politicians. Both politicians and voters are not always able to unilaterally change what campaign promises are achievable and therefore deemed credible.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken Ochieng' Opalo, 2021. "Formalizing clientelism in Kenya: From Harambee to the Constituency Development Fund," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-147, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-147
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Politics; Kenya; Clientelism; Politician; Voting behaviour; Reforms;
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