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Equité du plaider coupable : une analyse économétrique dans trois tribunaux de grande instance français

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  • ANCELOT Lydie

Abstract

La procédure française de plaider coupable suscite, depuis sa mise en place, de nombreux débats au coeur desquels apparaissent la liberté accordée aux magistrats dans leur prononcé de peines et la divergence de peines selon le niveau de ressources du prévenu et de surcroît selon le type de l’avocat (commis d’office ou non). Ce papier empirique apporte non seulement un éclairage sur ces débats mais également une nouvelle contribution à l’analyse économique du plaider coupable. Les résultats auxquels nous aboutissons s’avèrent particulièrement utiles au moment où la France réfléchit à l’extension du plaider coupable à l’ensemble des délits (Guinchard [2008]) mais également aux crimes (Léger [2009]). Nous testons les effets de critères, considérés comme relevant de l’équité horizontale et verticale de la justice, sur la peine infligée à l’encontre des prévenus. Nous montrons que le tribunal devant lequel comparaît le prévenu exerce un rôle fondamental sur la sanction infligée. Inversement, dans l’échantillon analysé, rien ne nous permet de mettre en évidence des divergences de peines selon que le prévenu est représenté (ou non) par un avocat commis d’office, ni selon son niveau de ressources. Cette étude nous permet également de comprendre les facteurs explicatifs de la condamnation à une peine privative de liberté dans l’échantillon analysé.

Suggested Citation

  • ANCELOT Lydie, 2010. "Equité du plaider coupable : une analyse économétrique dans trois tribunaux de grande instance français," Working Papers of BETA 2010-09, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2010-09
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    File URL: http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2010/2010-09.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    économie de la justice; plaider coupable; équité.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics

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