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Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the Federal Criminal Justice System

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  • Boylan, Richard T

Abstract

The effect of salaries on turnover and performance is analyzed for U.S. attorneys in office during the years 1969 through 1999. Lower salaries are shown to increase the turnover of U.S. attorneys, and higher turnover is shown to reduce output. Two features distinguish U.S. attorneys (chief federal prosecutors) from other public- and private-sector employees. First, since 1977, U.S. attorney salaries have been tied to the salaries of members of Congress and are thus exogenously determined. Second, there are public measures for the output of U.S. attorneys. Both features simplify the study of the effect of salaries on turnover and performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Boylan, Richard T, 2004. "Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the Federal Criminal Justice System," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 75-92, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2004:v:47:i:1:p:75-92
    DOI: 10.1086/378695
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    Cited by:

    1. Jamie Bologna Pavlik, 2017. "Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 346-372, December.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2014. "Queuing Up For Justice: Elections and Case Backlogs," Discussion Papers 14-10, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    3. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
    4. Garoupa, Nuno, 2009. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-28, March.
    5. Samantha Bielen & Peter Grajzl, 2021. "Prosecution or Persecution? Extraneous Events and Prosecutorial Decisions," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(4), pages 765-800, December.
    6. Bryan C. McCannon, 2021. "Informational value of challenging an incumbent prosecutor," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(2), pages 568-586, October.
    7. Kelman, Steven J. & Myers, Jeff, 2009. "Successfully Executing Ambitious Strategies in Government: An Empirical Analysis," Scholarly Articles 4481609, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    8. Manu Raghav, 2006. "Why do budgets received by state prosecutors vary across districts in the United States?," CAEPR Working Papers 2006-018, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    9. Romain Espinosa & Claudine Desrieux & Hengrui Wan, 2017. "Fewer courts, less justice? Evidence from the 2008 French reform of labor courts," Post-Print halshs-01634211, HAL.
    10. Bryan C. McCannon, 2013. "Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 696-714, December.
    11. Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav & Mark Ramseyer, 2009. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(1), pages 47-78.
    12. Giuseppe Arcuri & Nadine Levratto & Marianna Succurro, 2023. "Does commercial court organisation affect firms’ bankruptcy rate? evidence from the french judicial reform," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 573-601, June.
    13. Thomas J. Miles, 2012. "Racial Disparities in Wiretap Applications before Federal Judges," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 419-458.
    14. Robert S. Huckman & Jason Barro, 2005. "Cohort Turnover and Productivity: The July Phenomenon in Teaching Hospitals," NBER Working Papers 11182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Alexander Bolton & John M. de Figueiredo & David E. Lewis, 2016. "Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government," NBER Working Papers 22932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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