IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/coecpo/v42y2024i1p110-119.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Alaska's ban on sentence bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Bryan C. McCannon

Abstract

Plea bargaining dominates the U.S. criminal justice system and has garnered calls to reduce its prevalence. In 2013 Alaska's Attorney General acted banning a practice known as sentencing bargaining where the prosecutor negotiates with the defense over the length of the incarceration. I provide the first causal identification of this policy's impact on the plea bargaining rate. I show that the policy, by leaving open the charging discretion (in effect allowing charge bargaining), was ineffective at changing plea bargaining's prevalence across the state. Policymakers should look elsewhere for tools if they want to mitigate its rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan C. McCannon, 2024. "Alaska's ban on sentence bargaining," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(1), pages 110-119, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:42:y:2024:i:1:p:110-119
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12626
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12626
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/coep.12626?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan McCannon, 2014. "The effect of the election of prosecutors on criminal trials," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 141-156, October.
    2. SIDDHARTHA BANDYOPADHYAY & BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2015. "Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 219-256, April.
    3. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-728, September.
    4. William M. Landes, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 164-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Avishalom Tor & Oren Gazal‐Ayal & Stephen M. Garcia, 2010. "Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 97-116, March.
    6. Bryan C. McCannon, 2013. "Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 696-714, December.
    7. Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 749-757, September.
    8. Michael A. Roach, 2014. "Indigent Defense Counsel, Attorney Quality, and Defendant Outcomes," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 16(2), pages 577-619.
    9. David Bjerk, 2007. "Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 305-329.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
    2. Alexander Lundberg, 2024. "Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 650-674, April.
    3. Christmann, Robin, 2018. "Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight Bias in Adversary Legal Systems," MPRA Paper 84870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. DeAngelo, Gregory & McCannon, Bryan C. & Stockham, Morgan, 2023. "District attorney compensation and performance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    5. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2010. "Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining," Discussion Papers 10-28, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    6. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2010. "Credible plea bargaining," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 279-293, June.
    7. Brishti Guha, 2024. "Plea bargaining when juror effort is costly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 945-977, November.
    8. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2016. "Selecting among Acquitted Defendants: Procedural Choice versus Selective Compensation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 113-133, March.
    9. David Bjerk, 2021. "Socially Optimal Plea Bargaining With Costly Trials And Bayesian Juries," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 263-279, January.
    10. SIDDHARTHA BANDYOPADHYAY & BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2015. "Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 219-256, April.
    11. Guha, Brishti, 2023. "Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 209-225.
    12. Andrew F. Daughety & Reinganum F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00005, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    13. Yacov Tsur, 2017. "Bounding reasonable doubt: implications for plea bargaining," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 197-216, October.
    14. Tina Søreide & Kasper Vagle, 2022. "Settlements in corporate bribery cases: an illusion of choice?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 261-287, April.
    15. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    16. Boari, Nicola & Fiorentini, Gianluca, 2001. "An economic analysis of plea bargaining: the incentives of the parties in a mixed penal system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 213-231, June.
    17. Konstantinos Ioannidis & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2022. "Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 659-705.
    18. Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2019. "Political competition in judge and prosecutor elections," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 167-193, October.
    19. Richard Boylan & Cheryl Xiaoning Long, 2000. "Size, Monitoring and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0089, Econometric Society.
    20. Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi, 2024. "Law enforcement and political misinformation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 3-36, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:42:y:2024:i:1:p:110-119. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.