IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiucen/dddece78-e2d2-47cb-aa98-ec6af84b7917.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Auction Market for Journal Articles

Author

Listed:
  • Prüfer, J.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Zetland, D.

Abstract

Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current, push system for submitting papers and demonstrate that our proposed market has a stable, Pareto-improving equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this pull mechanism increases the quality of articles and journals and rewards referees for their effort. Although the auction price gives a prior on a paper's future value, its actual value|as a published article|depends on later citations. Since the auction price of later papers goes to the editors, authors and referees of earlier, cited articles, "auction earnings" give a direct measure of the value of articles, journals (the sum of articles) and academics - as authors, editors and reviewers - rewarding good writing, decisions and effort, respectively.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from ano
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Prüfer, J. & Zetland, D., 2007. "An Auction Market for Journal Articles," Discussion Paper 2007-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:dddece78-e2d2-47cb-aa98-ec6af84b7917
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/898539/dp2007-79.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    2. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2001. "Free Labour for Costly Journals?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 183-198, Fall.
    3. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 2001. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179.
    4. Andrew J. Oswald, 2007. "An Examination of the Reliability of Prestigious Scholarly Journals: Evidence and Implications for Decision‐Makers," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(293), pages 21-31, February.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
    6. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June.
    7. Oster, Sharon, 1980. "The Optimal Order for Submitting Manuscripts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 444-448, June.
    8. Joshua S. Gans & George B. Shepherd, 1994. "How Are the Mighty Fallen: Rejected Classic Articles by Leading Economists," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 165-179, Winter.
    9. Steven Pressman, 1994. "Simultaneous Multiple Journal Submissions: The Case Against," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 316-333, July.
    10. Michael Szenberg, 1994. "Disseminating Scholarly Output," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 303-315, July.
    11. Glenn Ellison, 2002. "The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 947-993, October.
    12. Eric W. K. Tsang & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "The as-is journal review process: Let authors own their ideas," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-09, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    13. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    14. William H. Starbuck, 2005. "How Much Better Are the Most-Prestigious Journals? The Statistics of Academic Publication," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 180-200, April.
    15. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    16. Glenn Ellison, 2002. "Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 994-1034, October.
    17. Hal R. Varian, 1997. "The AEA's Electronic Publishing Plans: A Progress Report," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 95-104, Summer.
    18. Glenn Ellison, 2011. "Is Peer Review In Decline?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 635-657, July.
    19. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
    20. Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1994. "Facts and Myths about Refereeing," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 153-163, Winter.
    21. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
    22. Daniel B. Klein & Eric Chiang, 2004. "The Social Science Citation Index: A Black Box—with an Ideological Bias?," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 1(1), pages 134-165, April.
    23. Terry Plum & David Colander, 2004. "Efficiency, Journal Publishing and Scholarly Research - A Discussion Paper," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0414, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    24. Blank, Rebecca M, 1991. "The Effects of Double-Blind versus Single-Blind Reviewing: Experimental Evidence from The American Economic Review," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1041-1067, December.
    25. JS Armstrong, 2004. "Peer Review for Journals: Evidence on Quality Control, Fairness, and Innovation," General Economics and Teaching 0412027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    26. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Louis de Mesnard, 2014. "On the marketization of the academic review process. (VF) Sur la marchandisation du processus de referee des revues académiques," Working Papers CREGO 1141001, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    2. Siddarth Srinivasan & Jamie Morgenstern, 2021. "Auctions and Peer Prediction for Academic Peer Review," Papers 2109.00923, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ofer H. Azar, 2006. "The Academic Review Process: How Can We Make it More Efficient?," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 50(1), pages 37-50, March.
    2. Sascha Baghestanian & Sergey V. Popov, 2018. "On publication, refereeing and working hard," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 1419-1459, November.
    3. Ofer H. Azar, 2005. "The Review Process in Economics: Is It Too Fast?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(2), pages 482-491, October.
    4. Azar Ofer H., 2015. "A Model of the Academic Review Process with Informed Authors," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 865-889, April.
    5. KRAPF, Matthias & SCHLÄPFER, Jörg, 2012. "How Nobel Laureates Would Perform In The Handelsblatt Ranking," Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 12(3).
    6. Bruno Frey, 2005. "Problems with Publishing: Existing State and Solutions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 173-190, April.
    7. Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Publishing as Prostitution? Choosing Between One�s Own Ideas and Academic Failure," IEW - Working Papers 117, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. Damien Besancenot & Kim Huynh & Joao Faria, 2012. "Search and research: the influence of editorial boards on journals’ quality," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 687-702, October.
    9. Ofer Azar, 2003. "Rejections and the Importance of First Response Times (Or: How Many Rejections Do Others Receive?)," General Economics and Teaching 0309002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Besancenot Damien & Faria João R. & Huynh Kim V., 2014. "Congestion of Academic Journals Under Papers’ Imperfect Selection," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(3), pages 1145-1167, July.
    11. Heintzelman Martin & Nocetti Diego, 2009. "Where Should we Submit our Manuscript? An Analysis of Journal Submission Strategies," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-28, September.
    12. Oswald, Andrew J., 2008. "Can We Test for Bias in Scientific Peer-Review?," IZA Discussion Papers 3665, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Seidl, Christian & Schmidt, Ulrich & Grösche, Peter, 2005. "The Performance of Peer Review and a Beauty Contest of Referee Processes of Economics Journals/," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 23, pages 505-551, Diciembre.
    14. Justus Haucap & Johannes Muck, 2015. "What drives the relevance and reputation of economics journals? An update from a survey among economists," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 103(3), pages 849-877, June.
    15. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2008. "Can incentives for research harm research? A business schools' tale," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1248-1265, June.
    16. Azar, Ofer H., 2008. "Evolution of social norms with heterogeneous preferences: A general model and an application to the academic review process," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 420-435, March.
    17. Justus Haucap & Nima Moshgbar & W. Benedikt Schmal, 2021. "The impact of the German 'DEAL' on competition in the academic publishing market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(8), pages 2027-2049, December.
    18. Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
    19. David Card & Stefano DellaVigna, 2020. "What Do Editors Maximize? Evidence from Four Economics Journals," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 195-217, March.
    20. Atal, Vidya, 2010. "Do journals accept too many papers?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 229-232, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Academic Journals; Academic Productivity; Market Design. JEL codes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:dddece78-e2d2-47cb-aa98-ec6af84b7917. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://center.uvt.nl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.