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On Local Environmental Protection

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  • Fabio Fiorillo
  • Agnese Sacchi

Abstract

We hereby propose a model to analyze the provision of environmental protection activities (United Nation 2005) with positive interregional externalities in order to verify - at least in theory - whether this kind of policy is better accomplished through centralized policymaking, which implies a coordinated solution among local representatives, or a decentralized system, whereby local authorities independently finance and implement their environmental protection policy. The research question concerns the identification of criteria on how to allocate powers and functions to environmental management at different tiers of government. Moreover, modelling interregional externalities as a mechanism contributing to lowering the cost of financing environmental policy in each region (production externality), we can assume that different environmental policies are allowed across regions. Given this general framework, considerations favouring either institutional setting in terms of individuals’ welfare seem to involve interaction among these key elements: the extent of the inter-jurisdictional spillovers, the size of local jurisdictions and the regional preferences for environmental protection policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Fiorillo & Agnese Sacchi, 2011. "On Local Environmental Protection," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0131, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
    • Handle: RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0131
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Barbara Ermini, Fabio Fiorillo, Raffaella Santolini, 2012. "Land Use And Italian Local Government Taxation: Environmental Protection Or Fund Rising Purposes?," RIEDS - Rivista Italiana di Economia, Demografia e Statistica - The Italian Journal of Economic, Demographic and Statistical Studies, SIEDS Societa' Italiana di Economia Demografia e Statistica, vol. 66(3-4), pages 95-102.
    2. Costantini, Valeria & Mazzanti, Massimiliano & Montini, Anna, 2013. "Environmental performance, innovation and spillovers. Evidence from a regional NAMEA," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 101-114.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental protection activities; Environmental federalism; Externalities; Local government;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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