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Efficient decentralized fiscal and environmental policy: A dual purpose Henry George tax

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  • Kunce, Mitch
  • Shogren, Jason F.

Abstract

One consequence of decentralized responsibility to set tax policy and environmental standards is that local governments might try to attract industry and jobs by underproviding local public goods with lower taxes or lax environmental standards or both. But if local authorities exploit fixed property site (i.e., land) taxation to fund local public goods, affect firm migration, and internalize potential local emission rents, herein we find decentralized efficiency is supported. This result reflects a dual form of the classic Henry George theorem previously overlooked.

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  • Kunce, Mitch & Shogren, Jason F., 2008. "Efficient decentralized fiscal and environmental policy: A dual purpose Henry George tax," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 569-573, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:65:y:2008:i:3:p:569-573
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    8. Xiaodong Yang & Jianlong Wang & Jianhong Cao & Siyu Ren & Qiying Ran & Haitao Wu, 2022. "The spatial spillover effect of urban sprawl and fiscal decentralization on air pollution: evidence from 269 cities in China," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 847-875, August.
    9. Xiangfeng Ji & Muhammad Umar & Shahid Ali & Wajid Ali & Kai Tang & Zeeshan Khan, 2021. "Does fiscal decentralization and eco‐innovation promote sustainable environment? A case study of selected fiscally decentralized countries," Sustainable Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 79-88, January.
    10. Ma, Hongqi & Zou, Jingxian & Cai, Hongbo & Zhang, Li, 2024. "Administrative division adjustment and environmental pollution: Evidence from City-County Mergers in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
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    12. Zhichao Li & Yilin Li, 2024. "The Impact of Intergovernmental Cooperation and Local Fiscal Autonomy on Environmental Regional Governance: Evidence From China Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration," SAGE Open, , vol. 14(2), pages 21582440241, June.
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