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Institutional Initiative of Functioning of Firms in Conditions of a Bilateral Monopoly
[Институциональная Инициатива Функционирования Фирм В Условиях Двусторонней Монополии]

Author

Listed:
  • Meleshkina, Anna (Мелешкина, Анна)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Shastitko, Anastasia (Шаститко, Анастасия)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

The work is based on the methodology of a comprehensive economic analysis of the problems of resolving conflicts of interest in intermediate goods markets with high switching costs, both on the demand side and on the supply side. The research is based on developments in the field of theory of market organization, game theory and institutional economic theory. The work analyzes the range of issues related to the negotiation process in determining the price of the intermediate goods, as well as the development of contract terms that reduce the risk of antimonopoly disputes arising in the conditions of a bilateral monopoly.

Suggested Citation

  • Meleshkina, Anna (Мелешкина, Анна) & Shastitko, Anastasia (Шаститко, Анастасия), 2018. "Institutional Initiative of Functioning of Firms in Conditions of a Bilateral Monopoly [Институциональная Инициатива Функционирования Фирм В Условиях Двусторонней Монополии]," Working Papers 041812, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:041812
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antimonopoly policy; intermediate goods; market concentration; switching costs; transaction management mechanisms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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