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More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Author

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  • Robert Axelrod

    (Institute of Public Policy Studies The University of Michigan)

Abstract

This study reports and analyzes the results of the second round of the computer tournament for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The object is to gain a deeper understanding of how to perform well in such a setting. The 62 entrants were able to draw lessons from the results of the first round and were able to design their entries to take these lessons into account. The results of the second round demonstrate a number of subtle pitfalls which specific types of decision rules can encounter. The winning rule was once again TIT FOR TAT, the rule which cooperates on the first move and then does what the other player did on the previous move. The analysis of the results shows the value of not being the first to defect, of being somewhat forgiving, but also the importance of being provocable. An analysis of hypothetical alternative tournaments demonstrates the robustness of the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Axelrod, 1980. "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(3), pages 379-403, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:24:y:1980:i:3:p:379-403
    DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400301
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    Cited by:

    1. Matus Halas, 2018. "Balancing Against Threats In Interactions Determined By Distance And Overall Gains," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(05), pages 1-22, August.
    2. repec:dgr:rugsom:01b40 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Oliveira, Fernando S. & Costa, Manuel L.G., 2018. "Capacity expansion under uncertainty in an oligopoly using indirect reinforcement-learning," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 267(3), pages 1039-1050.
    4. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 25-36, February.
    5. Meleshkina, Anna (Мелешкина, Анна) & Shastitko, Anastasia (Шаститко, Анастасия), 2018. "Institutional Initiative of Functioning of Firms in Conditions of a Bilateral Monopoly [Институциональная Инициатива Функционирования Фирм В Условиях Двусторонней Монополии]," Working Papers 041812, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    6. Pedro Ribeiro de Andrade & Antonio Miguel Vieira Monteiro & Gilberto Câmara & Sandra Sandri, 2009. "Games on Cellular Spaces: How Mobility Affects Equilibrium," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(1), pages 1-5.
    7. Tarik Tazdaït & Alejandro Caparros & Jean-Chrsitophe Péreau, 2008. "Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolution Analysis," Working Papers halshs-00275386, HAL.
    8. Rudolf Vetschera & D. Marc Kilgour, 2013. "Strategic Behavior in Contested-Pile Methods for Fair Division of Indivisible Items," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 299-319, March.
    9. Jager, W. & Janssen, M. A. & De Vries, H. J. M. & De Greef, J. & Vlek, C. A. J., 2000. "Behaviour in commons dilemmas: Homo economicus and Homo psychologicus in an ecological-economic model," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 357-379, December.
    10. Lawrence C. Reardon, 2011. "Ideational Learning and the Paradox of Chinese Catholic Reconciliation," Journal of Current Chinese Affairs - China aktuell, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 40(2), pages 43-70.
    11. Travers, Henry & Clements, Tom & Keane, Aidan & Milner-Gulland, E.J., 2011. "Incentives for cooperation: The effects of institutional controls on common pool resource extraction in Cambodia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 151-161.
    12. Walid F. Nasrallah & Karim A. Cheaib, 2016. "An equilibrium model of how regulative and normative institutions influence micro-economic and organizational behavior," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 383-411, December.
    13. Romero, Julian & Rosokha, Yaroslav, 2018. "Constructing strategies in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 185-219.
    14. Lucas Kruitwagen & Kaveh Madani & Ben Caldecott & Mark H. W. Workman, 2017. "Game theory and corporate governance: conditions for effective stewardship of companies exposed to climate change risks," Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 14-36, January.
    15. Jager, Wander & Janssen, Marco A., 2001. "Diffusion processes in demographic transitions: a prospect on using multi agent simulation to explore the role of cognitive strategies and social interactions," Research Report 01B40, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    16. Todd Guilfoos & Andreas Pape, 2016. "Predicting human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma using case-based decision theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 1-32, January.
    17. Dridi, Slimane & Lehmann, Laurent, 2014. "On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 20-36.
    18. Alejandro Lee-Penagos, 2016. "Learning to Coordinate: Co-Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 2016-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    19. Schimit, P.H.T., 2016. "Evolutionary aspects of spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma in a population modeled by continuous probabilistic cellular automata and genetic algorithm," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 290(C), pages 178-188.
    20. Zhang, Huanren, 2018. "Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 203-219.
    21. Jui-Chung Allen Li & Yeh-Chen Chen, 2012. "Personality, Affects, and Forgiving Behavior in Games," Working Papers WR-952, RAND Corporation.
    22. Murnighan, J. Keith & Wang, Long, 2016. "The social world as an experimental game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 80-94.
    23. Menezes, Flavio Marques, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata: A Survey," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 12(1), April.
    24. Monterosso, John & Ainslie, George & Pamela Toppi Mullen, P. A. -C. & Gault, Barbara, 2002. "The fragility of cooperation: A false feedback study of a sequential iterated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 437-448, August.
    25. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.

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