Should Individuals Choose their Own Incentives? Evidence from a Mindfulness Meditation Intervention
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More about this item
Keywords
monetary incentives; dynamic incentives; field experiment; mental health;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2024-01-29 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2024-01-29 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HEA-2024-01-29 (Health Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2024-01-29 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
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