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The sale of relational capital through tenure profiles and tournaments

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Abstract

In this paper, a specific form of human capital is analyzed, relational capital, which consists of matches between market parties. Search and information costs make these matches valuable to both parties. Its peculiarity is that the control over such matches is transferred within firms from those who initially control it to anyone who works with it for a period. This characteristic allows someone who approaches the end of his working life to sell his relational capital to junior partners. This sale can explain upward sloping tenure profiles and can result in tournaments if juniors are budget constrained and perfect contracting is not possible. The need to keep the amount of relational capital constant implies a generation balanced workforce within each firm.

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  • Paul Frijters, 1998. "The sale of relational capital through tenure profiles and tournaments," Discussion Papers Series 443, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  • Handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:443
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    File URL: https://economics.uq.edu.au/files/44242/443.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Bezemer, Dirk & Dulleck, Uwe & Frijters, Paul, 2005. "Social Capital, Creative Destruction and Economic Development," Research Report 05C09, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    2. Uwe Dulleck & Dirk J. Bezemer & Paul Frijters, 2004. "Social Capital, Creative Destruction and Economic Growth," Vienna Economics Papers 0406, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    3. Paul Frijters & Dirk J Bezemer & Uwe Dulleck, 2005. "Contacts, Market Institutions, and Development," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 205a, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
    4. Frijters, Paul, 2000. "Do individuals try to maximize general satisfaction?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 281-304, June.
    5. repec:dgr:rugsom:05c09 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Uwe Dulleck & Dirk J. Bezemer & Paul Frijters, 2004. "Social Capital, Creative Destruction and Economic Growth," Vienna Economics Papers vie0406, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    7. Paul Frijters & Dirk Bezemer & Uwe Dulleck, 2003. "Socialism, Capitalism, and Transition - Coordination of Economic Relations and Output Performance," Paul Frijters Discussion Papers 2003, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.

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