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Efficient Contests

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  • Christian Riis

Abstract

In their seminal contribution, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient effort as incentive‐based reward schemes. They also show that this equivalence result is not robust toward heterogeneity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information because it is not possible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self‐selection constraints and first‐best incentives. This paper demonstrates that efficiency can be achieved by a simple modification of the prize scheme in a mixed (heterogenous) contest where contestants learn their type after entry. If contestants know their type before entering the contest, rent extraction becomes an issue. Implications for optimal contest design are also explored. Finally, the relationship between effort maximizing contests and profit maximizing contests are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Riis, 2010. "Efficient Contests," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 643-665, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:643-665
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00265.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fares, M'hand & Orozco, Luis, 2014. "Tournament Mechanism in Wine-Grape Contracts: Evidence from a French Wine Cooperative," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 320-345, December.
    2. Kristoffer W. Eriksen & Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2011. "Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(3), pages 729-753, September.
    3. Marinakis, Kosmas & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2013. "Are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 223-237.
    4. Golman, Russell & Bhatia, Sudeep, 2012. "Performance evaluation inflation and compression," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 534-543.
    5. Kevin J. Boudreau & Nicola Lacetera & Karim R. Lakhani, 2011. "Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(5), pages 843-863, May.
    6. Dongryul Lee & Joon Song, 2019. "Optimal Team Contests to Induce More Efforts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(3), pages 448-476, April.
    7. Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2012. "A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 161-190, March.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:41:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS

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