Monitoring Harassment in Organizations
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References listed on IDEAS
- Mehmet Bac, 2009. "An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 233-256, June.
- Sandeep Kapur, 2009. "An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 157-182, May.
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Cited by:
- Cai, Xiqian & Chen, Shuai & Cheng, Zhengquan, 2024. "The #MeToo Movement and Judges' Gender Gap in Decisions," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1453, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
- Nugent, Jeffrey B., 2023. "A new institutional perspective on business associations: Filling a gap between firms and states in the dynamic analysis of Richard Day," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 49-59.
- Cai, Xiqian & Chen, Shuai & Cheng, Zhengquan, 2024. "The #Metoo Movement and Judges' Gender Gap in Decisions," IZA Discussion Papers 17115, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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More about this item
Keywords
Harassment; whistleblowing; garbling; secure survey design; gender; garments; Bangladesh;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C42 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Survey Methods
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
- J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
- J83 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Workers' Rights
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2023-11-20 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2023-11-20 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LMA-2023-11-20 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages)
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