An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
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- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
References listed on IDEAS
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