One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
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- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Information Aggregation; Multicandidate Elections; Approval Votting; Poisson Games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
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