A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0129-8
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Cited by:
- McMurray, Joseph, 2017. "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 199-223.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Xefteris, Dimitris, 2021.
"Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes,"
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ubk7p, Center for Open Science.
- Amrita Dhillon & Grammateia Kotsialou & Dilip Ravindran & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2023. "Information aggregation with delegation of votes," Papers 2306.03960, arXiv.org.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Ravindran, Dilip & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 665, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Philippos Louis & Orestis Troumpounis & Nikolaos Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2020.
"Protest voting in the laboratory,"
Working Papers
288072952, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Philippos Louis & Orestis Troumpounis & Nikolaos Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2020. "Protest voting in the laboratory," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0247, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Nobuhiro Mizuno & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2022.
"Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(3), pages 443-477, July.
- Mizuno, Nobuhiro & Okazawa, Ryosuke, 2018. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," MPRA Paper 89215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kirill S. Evdokimov, 2024. "Monopoly agenda control with privately informed voters," Papers 2402.06495, arXiv.org.
- Oliveros, Santiago, 2013. "Abstention, ideology and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 871-902.
- Gratton, Gabriele, 2014.
"Pandering and electoral competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
- Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "Pandering and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 2012-22B, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Callander, Steven, 2008. "Majority rule when voters like to win," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 393-420, November.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2011. "Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 586-593, June.
- Chen, Jidong, 2023. "Sequential agenda setting with strategic and informative voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
- Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper 82753, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Meirowitz, Adam & Shotts, Kenneth W., 2009. "Pivots versus signals in elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 744-771, March.
- Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
- Patrick Hummel, 2011. "Proportional versus winner-take-all electoral vote allocations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 381-393, September.
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