IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/47629.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection?

Author

Listed:
  • Bellemare, Marc F.
  • Carnes, Nicholas

Abstract

It seems paradoxical that developed countries continue subsidizing agriculture even though their agricultural sectors have been declining in relative importance since the middle of the 20th century. What drives support for agricultural protection in developed countries? We answer this question by testing three competing hypotheses about what drives support for agricultural protection in the US: (i) legislator preferences, (ii) electoral incentives, or (iii) lobbying. Using data on the roll call votes of the members of the 106th through the 110th Congresses (1999-2009) and the scores given to each legislator by the Farm Bureau, our findings suggest electoral incentives explain a great deal of the variation in support for agricultural protection, but that legislator preferences and lobbying play a role, too. Moreover, legislator preferences and electoral incentives appear to be substitutes for one another. Why does Congress support agricultural protection? Because many members have electoral incentives to—and because many of those who do not still have other personal or strategic interests at stake.

Suggested Citation

  • Bellemare, Marc F. & Carnes, Nicholas, 2013. "Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection?," MPRA Paper 47629, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:47629
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47629/1/MPRA_paper_47629.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2010. "The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies: Recent Contributions, New Insights, and Areas for Further Research," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 32(1), pages 33-58.
    2. Anderson, Kym, 1995. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 401-423, January.
    3. Beghin, John C & Kherallah, Mylene, 1994. "Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(3), pages 482-489, August.
    4. Rigoberto A. Lopez, 2001. "Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 257-279, November.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    6. Jonathan C. Brooks & A. Colin Cameron & Colin A. Carter, 1998. "Political Action Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(3), pages 441-454.
    7. Allen, Douglas W, 1991. "Homesteading and Property Rights; or, "How the West Was Really Won."," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-23, April.
    8. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    9. David G. Abler, 1991. "Campaign Contributions and House Voting on Sugar and Dairy Legislation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 73(1), pages 11-17.
    10. Marc F. Bellemare & Christopher B. Barrett & David R. Just, 2013. "The Welfare Impacts of Commodity Price Volatility: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(4), pages 877-899.
    11. Barrett, Christopher B., 1999. "The microeconomics of the developmental paradox: on the political economy of food price policy," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 159-172, March.
    12. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    13. Hall, Richard L. & Wayman, Frank W., 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 797-820, September.
    14. Johan F. M. Swinnen, 1994. "A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(1), pages 1-14.
    15. Kym Anderson & Gordon Rausser & Johan Swinnen, 2013. "Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 423-477, June.
    16. Miller, Warren E. & Stokes, Donald E., 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 45-56, March.
    17. Gawande, Kishore & Hoekman, Bernard, 2006. "Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 527-561, July.
    18. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    19. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoğlu, 2016. "“Protection For Sale” In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 9, pages 163-174, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    20. Johan F. M. Swinnen & Harry De Gorter, 1993. "Why Small Groups And Low Income Sectors Obtain Subsidies: The “Altruistic” Side Of A “Self‐Interested” Government," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 285-293, November.
    21. Orden, David & Paarlberg, Robert & Roe, Terry, 1999. "Policy Reform in American Agriculture," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226632643, December.
    22. Hall, Richard L. & Deardorff, Alan V., 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 69-84, February.
    23. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    24. Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "Are legislators ideologues or the agents of constituents?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 707-717, April.
    25. Jong Hee Park & Nathan Jensen, 2007. "Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(2), pages 314-329, April.
    26. Brooks, Jonathan, 1997. "Congressional Voting On Farm Payment Limitations: Political Pressure Of Ideological Conviction?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 1-15, December.
    27. Stephen D. Levitt, 1998. "Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 19-35, March.
    28. Bellemare, Marc F., 2011. "Rising food prices, food price volatility, and political unrest," MPRA Paper 31888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    29. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob de Haan, 2013. "Conditional Election and Partisan Cycles in Government Support to the Agricultural Sector: An Empirical Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(4), pages 793-818.
    30. Vesenka, Mary H., 1989. "Economic interests and ideological conviction : A note on PACs and agricultural acts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 259-263, October.
    31. Abmann, Christian & Henning, Christian H.C.A. & Krampe, Eva, 2012. "Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection in Developing and Industrial Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124885, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    32. Bellemare, Marc F. & Barrett, Christopher B. & Just, David R., 2010. "The Welfare Impacts of Commodity Price Fluctuations: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia," MPRA Paper 24457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    33. De Gorter, Harry & Swinnen, Johan, 2002. "Political economy of agricultural policy," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 36, pages 1893-1943, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Why is the agricultural sector still protected in the US?
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-08-21 20:28:00
    2. Yours Truly in the Globe and Mail
      by Marc F. Bellemare in Marc F. Bellemare on 2013-07-11 14:00:40
    3. Yours Truly in the Pacific Standard
      by Marc F. Bellemare in Marc F. Bellemare on 2013-07-03 14:00:53
    4. Of Gold Standards and Golden Means
      by Marc F. Bellemare in Marc F. Bellemare on 2013-09-09 14:00:24
    5. New Working Paper: Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection?
      by Marc F. Bellemare in Marc F. Bellemare on 2013-06-24 14:00:45
    6. New Working Paper: Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection?
      by ? in Marc F. Bellemare on 2013-06-24 15:00:00
    7. Yours Truly in the Globe and Mail
      by ? in Marc F. Bellemare on 2013-07-11 15:00:00
    8. Yours Truly in the Pacific Standard
      by ? in Marc F. Bellemare on 2013-07-03 15:00:00
    9. Of Gold Standards and Golden Means
      by ? in Marc F. Bellemare on 2013-09-09 15:00:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gabriel Medina & Catherine Isley & J. Arbuckle, 2021. "Promoting sustainable agriculture: Iowa stakeholders’ perspectives on the US Farm Bill conservation programs," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 173-194, January.
    2. Jacek Kulawik, 2015. "Wspólna polityka rolna Unii Europejskiej w perspektywie globalnej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 5, pages 119-143.
    3. Andrew J Tanentzap & Anthony Lamb & Susan Walker & Andrew Farmer, 2015. "Resolving Conflicts between Agriculture and the Natural Environment," PLOS Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(9), pages 1-13, September.
    4. Beach, Brian & Jones, Daniel B., 2016. "Business as usual: Politicians with business experience, government finances, and policy outcomes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 292-307.
    5. Zhike Lv & Ting Xu, 2019. "Do economic sanctions affect protectionism? Evidence from agricultural support," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 27-42, March.
    6. Sébastien Mary, 2019. "Hungry for free trade? Food trade and extreme hunger in developing countries," Food Security: The Science, Sociology and Economics of Food Production and Access to Food, Springer;The International Society for Plant Pathology, vol. 11(2), pages 461-477, April.
    7. Moon, Wanki & Sakuyama, Takumi, 2021. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Policy in Northeast Asia: Comparisons with the West and between Japan and Korea," 2021 Conference, August 17-31, 2021, Virtual 315192, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    8. Briones Alonso, Elena & Swinnen, Johan, 2016. "Who are the producers and consumers? Value chains and food policy effects in the wheat sector in Pakistan," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 40-58.
    9. Walls, Helen L. & Cornelsen, Laura & Lock, Karen & Smith, Richard D., 2016. "How much priority is given to nutrition and health in the EU Common Agricultural Policy?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 12-23.
    10. Wanki Moon & Gabriel Pino, 2018. "Do U.S. citizens support government intervention in agriculture? Implications for the political economy of agricultural protection," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 49(1), pages 119-129, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kym Anderson & Gordon Rausser & Johan Swinnen, 2013. "Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 423-477, June.
    2. Clas Eriksson, 2011. "Home bias in preferences and the political economics of agricultural protection," Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 92(1), pages 5-23.
    3. repec:lic:licosd:27911 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Swinnen, Johan F. M. & Banerjee, Anurag N. & Gorter, Harry de, 2001. "Economic development, institutional change, and the political economy of agricultural protection: An econometric study of Belgium since the 19th century," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 25-43, October.
    5. Fertő, Imre, 1998. "Az agrárpolitika politikai gazdaságtana II. Az agrárpolitikák magyarázata [The political economy of agrarian policy. Part II. Explanation of the agrarian policies]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 297-316.
    6. Eriksson, Clas, 2011. "Home bias in preferences and the political economics of agricultural protection," Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement (RAEStud), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 92(1).
    7. Klomp, Jeroen, 2014. "The political economy of agricultural liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe: An empirical analysis," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(P1), pages 332-346.
    8. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2009. "Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 50299, World Bank.
    9. Jonathan Brooks, 1996. "Agricultural Policies In Oecd Countries: What Can We Learn From Political Economy Models?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1‐4), pages 366-389, January.
    10. De Gorter, Harry & Swinnen, Jo, 1995. "The Political Economy and Institutional Determinants of Public Policy in Agriculture," 1994 Conference, August 22-29, 1994, Harare, Zimbabwe 183390, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    11. Gawande, Kishore, 2005. "The structure of lobbying and protection in U.S. agriculture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3722, The World Bank.
    12. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    13. Alessandro Olper & Johan Swinnen, 2013. "Mass Media and Public Policy: Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 27(3), pages 413-436.
    14. Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2008. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: Europe in the 19th and 20th Century," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 43859, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    15. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    16. Jaerim Choi & Sunghun Lim, 2023. "Tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and the 2020 US presidential election," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(4), pages 1149-1175, August.
    17. repec:lic:licosd:23209 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Harry de Gorter & Johan F. M. Swinnen, 1994. "The Economic Polity Of Farm Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 312-326, September.
    19. Alessandro Olper & Jan Fałkowski & Johan Swinnen, 2014. "Political Reforms and Public Policy: Evidence from Agricultural and Food Policies," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 28(1), pages 21-47.
    20. Mockshell, Jonathan & Birner, Regina, 2015. "Donors and domestic policy makers: Two worlds in agricultural policy-making?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-14.
    21. Stadelmann, David & Torrens, Gustavo, 2020. "Who is the ultimate boss of legislators: Voters, special interest groups or parties?," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224562, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    22. repec:lic:licosd:32312 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Olper, Alessandro & Falkowski, Jan & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2009. "Democracy and Agricultural Protection: Parametric and Semi-parametric Matching Estimates," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49313, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agricultural Policy; Agricultural Protection; Farm Bill; Congress; Voting; Lobbying;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:47629. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.