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Are legislators ideologues or the agents of constituents?

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  • Poole, Keith T.
  • Rosenthal, Howard

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  • Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "Are legislators ideologues or the agents of constituents?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 707-717, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:40:y:1996:i:3-5:p:707-717
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 1991. "The Spatial Mapping of Minimum Wage Legislation," NBER Chapters, in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 215-250, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "Introduction to "The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy"," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
    4. Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1985. "The political economy of roll-call voting in the "multi-party" congress of the United States," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 45-58.
    5. James B. Kau & Donald Keenan & Paul H. Rubin, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 271-293.
    6. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
    7. Gilligan, Thomas W & Marshall, William J & Weingast, Barry R, 1989. "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 35-61, April.
    8. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-384, October.
    9. Goldin, Claudia & Libecap, Gary D. (ed.), 1994. "The Regulated Economy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226301105.
    10. Krehbiel, Keith, 1993. "Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 21-37, June.
    11. Poole, Keith T & Romer, Thomas, 1993. "Ideology, "Shirking", and Representation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 185-196, September.
    12. Poole, Keith T & Rosenthal, Howard, 1993. "The Enduring Nineteenth-Century Battle for Economic Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Act Revisited," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 837-860, October.
    13. Alberto Alesina & Geoffrey Carliner, 1991. "Politics and Economics in the Eighties," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number ales91-1.
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