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Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?

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  • Stephen D. Levitt

Abstract

Political Action Committees (PACs) can affect public policies in either of two ways: altering legislators’ roll‐call voting behavior, or influencing election outcomes. This paper develops a dynamic model demonstrating that the relative importance of the election‐influencing channel is easily underestimated. A one‐time contribution to a candidate who supports the PAC's position that alters an election outcome yields benefits to the PAC as long as that candidate holds office. In contrast, roll‐call vote buying is likely to operate on a quid‐pro‐quo basis, limiting the PAC's return on investment. Empirical tests based on the theoretical model suggest that PACs value the election‐influencing aspect of contributions at least as much as the roll‐call vote‐buying channel.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen D. Levitt, 1998. "Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 19-35, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:19-35
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00036
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    Cited by:

    1. Bellemare, Marc F. & Carnes, Nicholas, 2015. "Why do members of congress support agricultural protection?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 20-34.
    2. Jeffrey Milyo & David M. Primo, 2005. "Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence From the States," Working Papers 0513, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    3. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2005. "Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 467-482, March.
    4. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2019. "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions," SocArXiv nphgu, Center for Open Science.
    5. Paul Heaton, 2005. "Oil for What?—Illicit Iraqi Oil Contracts and the U.N. Security Council," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 193-206, Fall.
    6. James E. Anderson & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Political Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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