IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/33808.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Three alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory

Author

Listed:
  • Giocoli, Nicola

Abstract

The paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the role of antitrust case law, and in particular of the rehabilitation, via game theory, of some traditional antitrust prohibitions and limitations which had been challenged by the Chicago approach. The third story centers on the wealth of issues classifiable under the general headline of "mechanism design" and on the game theoretical tools and methods which have been applied to tackle them. The bottom lines are, first, that the three stories need not be viewed as conflicting, but rather as complementary, and, second, that in all stories a central role has been played by John Harsanyi and Bayesian decision theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Three alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory," MPRA Paper 33808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33808
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33808/1/MPRA_paper_33808.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. Myerson, 2010. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 6.
    2. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919.
    3. Nicola Giocoli, 2004. "Nash Equilibrium," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 639-666, Winter.
    4. Schotter, Andrew & Schwodiauer, Gerhard, 1980. "Economics and the Theory of Games: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 479-527, June.
    5. Nicola Giocoli, 2003. "Modeling Rational Agents," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2585.
    6. Reder, Melvin W, 1982. "Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-38, March.
    7. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    8. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
    9. Myerson, Roger, 2001. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 20-25, July.
    10. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2000. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
    11. Nicola Giocoli, 2001. "Fixing the point: the contribution of early game theory to the tool-box of modern economics," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 1-39.
    12. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1978. "Arbitration of Two-party Disputes under Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 595-604.
    13. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    14. Kovacic, William E, 1992. "The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 294-306, April.
    15. Giocoli, Nicola, 2005. "Mathematics as the role model for neoclassical economics (Blanqui Lecture)," MPRA Paper 33806, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Competition vs. property rights: American antitrust law, the Freiburg School and the early years of European competition policy," MPRA Paper 33807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Rizvi, S Abu Turab, 1994. "Game Theory to the Rescue?," Contributions to Political Economy, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 13(0), pages 1-28.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 1420-1454, November.
    2. Lise Arena & Leonard Minkes, 2019. "The virtues of dialogue between academics and businessmen," Post-Print hal-01620574, HAL.
    3. Giocoli, Nicola, 2011. "From Wald to Savage: homo economicus becomes a Bayesian statistician," MPRA Paper 34117, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nicola Giocoli, 2013. "Games judges don't play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 271-330.
    2. Argenton, C., 2010. "Predation Under Perfect Information," Discussion Paper 2010-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Mason, Robin & Weeds, Helen, 2013. "Merger policy, entry, and entrepreneurship," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-38.
    4. Nicola Giocoli, 2009. "Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust Law, The Freiburg School, And The Early Years Of European Competition Policy," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 747-786.
    5. Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Competition vs. property rights: American antitrust law, the Freiburg School and the early years of European competition policy," MPRA Paper 33807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Alessandro Innocenti, 2004. "Paradoxes versus formalism in economics. Evidence from the early years of game theory and experimental economics," Department of Economics University of Siena 433, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    7. Bayer, Christian, 2007. "Investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(9), pages 3069-3109, September.
    8. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 2013. "The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses," NBER Working Papers 18783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Paulson Gjerde, Kathy A. & Slotnick, Susan A., 2004. "Quality and reputation: The effects of external and internal factors over time," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 1-20, May.
    10. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    11. Germán Coloma, 2002. "Un Modelo Integrado de Depredación y Colusión," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 39(116), pages 123-133.
    12. William Tracy, 2014. "Paradox Lost: The Evolution of Strategies in Selten’s Chain Store Game," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 43(1), pages 83-103, January.
    13. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 116-136.
    14. Gilles Hilary & Sterling Huang, 2023. "Trust and Contracting: Evidence from Church Sex Scandals," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 182(2), pages 421-442, January.
    15. Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Game theory and industrial organization," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895, Elsevier.
    16. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    17. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1085-1102, September.
    18. Schatzel, Kim & Droge, Cornelia & Calantone, Roger, 2003. "Strategic channel activity preannouncements: An exploratory investigation of antecedent effects," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 56(12), pages 923-933, December.
    19. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
    20. Butler, Jeffrey V. & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2020. "Past performance and entry in procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 179-195.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; mechanism design; refinements of Nash equilibrium; antitrust law; John Harsanyi;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33808. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.