Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Steven J Brams & D Marc Kilgour, 2012. "Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 507-525, October.
References listed on IDEAS
- Laurent Bouton, 2013.
"A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1248-1288, June.
- Laurent Bouton, 2012. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2012-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Laurent Bouton, 2013. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/160854, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- I. D. Hill, 2008. "Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair‐division Procedures," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 171(4), pages 1032-1033, October.
- Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, 2007. "The Laakso-Taagepera Index in A Mean and Variance Framework," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(1), pages 101-106, January.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
- Friedrich Pukelsheim & Albert W. Marshall & Ingram Olkin, 2002. "A majorization comparison of apportionment methods in proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 885-900.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- D. Marc Kilgour, 2016. "Approval elections with a variable number of winners," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(2), pages 199-211, August.
- Duddy, Conal, 2014. "Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 14-16.
- Martin Lackner & Jan Maly, 2020. "Approval-Based Shortlisting," Papers 2005.07094, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012.
"One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Working Papers ECARES 2008-017, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2014.
"Satisfaction Approval Voting,"
Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Rudolf Fara & Dennis Leech & Maurice Salles (ed.), Voting Power and Procedures, edition 127, pages 323-346,
Springer.
- Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016.
"Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
- Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2015. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 777, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Micael Castanheira De Moura & Laurent Bouton & A. Llorente-Saguer, 2016. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/242105, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "When does approval voting make the "right choices"?," MPRA Paper 34262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004.
"Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
- Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver, 2001. "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners," Working Papers 0107, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
- Kaveh Madani & Laura Read & Laleh Shalikarian, 2014. "Voting Under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Framework for Analyzing Group Decision Making Problems," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(7), pages 1839-1856, May.
- Costel Andonie & Daniel Diermeier, 2022. "Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 683-733, October.
- Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003.
"Between liberalism and democracy,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June.
- David Schmeidler, 1998. "Between Liberalism and Democracy," Working Papers 98-18, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- David Schmeidler, 2000. "Between LIberalism and Democracy," Working Papers 00-08, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- Dov Samet & David Schmeidler, 1999. "Between Liberalism and Democracy," Game Theory and Information 9908001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 2013.
"Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 1-18, June.
- Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams, 2009. "Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2009.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation," MPRA Paper 22710, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, Marc, 2009. "Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation," Sustainable Development Papers 52337, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Eyal Baharad & Jacob Goldberger & Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012.
"Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 113-130, January.
- Eyal Baharad & Jacob Goldberger & Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records," Working Papers 2010-20, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Eyal Baharad & Jacob Goldberger & Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan, 2011. "Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records," CESifo Working Paper Series 3323, CESifo.
- Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2012.
"The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 615-631, July.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2009. "The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items," MPRA Paper 12774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Efthymios Athanasiou & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Shlomo Weber, 2015. "Language learning and communicative benefits," Working Papers 15.09, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Claude Hillinger, 2005.
"The Case for Utilitarian Voting,"
Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 23, pages 295-321.
- Hillinger, Claude, 2005. "The Case for Utilitarian Voting," Discussion Papers in Economics 653, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2005.
"Collective choice under dichotomous preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 165-184, June.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2003. "Collective Choice under Dichotomous Preferences," Working Papers 2003-09, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/45gqdl5l4387f9b9l12gr2g3kt is not listed on IDEAS
- Durand, François & Macé, Antonin & Núñez, Matías, 2024.
"Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 1-34.
- François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2023. "Voter coordination in elections : a case for approval voting," Working Papers halshs-03162184, HAL.
- François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matías Núñez, 2024. "Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-04630490, HAL.
- François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matías Núñez, 2024. "Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting," Post-Print halshs-04630490, HAL.
- François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2023. "Voter coordination in elections : a case for approval voting," PSE Working Papers halshs-03162184, HAL.
- André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & François Poinas & Karine Straeten, 2015.
"Citizens’ preferences about voting rules: self-interest, ideology, and sincerity,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 423-442, September.
- André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & François Poinas & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Citizens’ preferences about voting rules: self-interest, ideology, and sincerity," Post-Print halshs-01310218, HAL.
- André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & François Poinas & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Citizens’ preferences about voting rules: self-interest, ideology, and sincerity," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01310218, HAL.
- François Maniquet & Philippe Mongin, 2015.
"Approval voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 519-532, March.
- Mongin, Philippe & Maniquet, François, 2011. "Approval voting and arrow's impossibility theorem," HEC Research Papers Series 954, HEC Paris.
- Antonin Macé, 2017. "Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting," Working Papers halshs-01222200, HAL.
- Marcella Maia Urtiga & Danielle Costa Morais & Keith W. Hipel & D. Marc Kilgour, 2017. "Group Decision Methodology to Support Watershed Committees in Choosing Among Combinations of Alternatives," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 729-752, July.
- Laszlo A. Koczy & Peter Biro & Balazs Sziklai, 2017. "US vs. European Apportionment Practices: The Conflict between Monotonicity and Proportionality," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1716, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
More about this item
Keywords
voting; contenders in elections; runoffs; apportionment; fairness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2011-05-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-05-07 (Positive Political Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.