How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
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Other versions of this item:
- Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2009. "How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 229-241, Springer.
References listed on IDEAS
- Robert Sugden, 2009. "Neither Self-interest Nor Self-sacrifice: The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 259-283, Springer.
- I. D. Hill, 2008. "Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair‐division Procedures," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 171(4), pages 1032-1033, October.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521555838 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2018. "Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 65-77, June.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2012. "Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes," MPRA Paper 41773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wood, Peter John, 2010. "Climate Change and Game Theory: a Mathematical Survey," Working Papers 249379, Australian National University, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy.
- Peter J. Wood, 2010. "Climate Change and Game Theory: A Mathematical Survey," CCEP Working Papers 0210, Centre for Climate & Energy Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
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More about this item
Keywords
Democracy; voting; social choice; public goods; game theory; Prisoners' Dilemma; Bible;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2009-01-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2009-01-24 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-01-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-01-24 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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