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The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits

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  • João Ricardo Faria
  • Gonçalo Monteiro

Abstract

Why do some academics continue to be productive after receiving tenure? This paper answers this question by using a Stackelberg differential game between departments and scholars. We show that departments can set tenure rules and standards as incentives for scholars to accumulate academic habits. As a result, academic habits have a lasting positive impact in scholar’s productivity, leading to higher scholar’s productivity rate of growth and higher productivity level.

Suggested Citation

  • João Ricardo Faria & Gonçalo Monteiro, "undated". "The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits," Discussion Papers 05/32, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:05/32
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    Cited by:

    1. Brian H Spitzberg, 2018. "Framing the Game: An Architectonic Analogue for Meta-Theorizing Academic Activities," Studies in Media and Communication, Redfame publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 11-25, June.
    2. Paul Levine & Peter McAdam & Peter Welz, 2013. "On Habit and the Socially Efficient Level of Consumption and Work Effort," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0713, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    3. Besancenot, Damien & Huynh, Kim & Vranceanu, Radu, 2006. "The "Read or Write" Dilemma in Academic Production: A European Perspective," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06021, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    4. João Ricardo Faria & Rajeev K. Goel, 2016. "Academic Publication Uncertainty and Publishing Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 6176, CESifo.
    5. Damien Besancenot & Kim Huynh & Radu Vranceanu, 2009. "The ‘Read or Write’ Dilemma in Academic Production: A Transatlantic Perspective," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 53(1), pages 75-84, March.
    6. Joao Ricardo Faria & Peter McAdam, 2014. "Does Tenure Make Researchers Less Productive? The Case of the “Specialist”," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0514, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Role of economists; sociology of economics.;

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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