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Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections

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  • Richard van Weelden

Abstract

We study an elections model in which political parties are internally divided betweenan “elite†and a “base†whose preferences are imperfectly aligned. Elites are better informedabout the quality of potential nominees, and their endorsements can identify andpromote high quality candidates. However, elites may also choose to restrict their endorsementsto candidates who adopt their preferred policies. We introduce a threat ofentry from outsider candidates, who have the prominence and resources to bypass partyelites. We consider when voters will turn to an outsider candidate, and identify the conditionsunder which an outsider challenge will come in the primary as opposed to as athird-party candidacy. We further explore when this threat disciplines elite endorsementsand the conditions under which outsider challenges are most likely to succeed.

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  • Richard van Weelden, 2017. "Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections," Working Paper 6327, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
  • Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:6327
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    Cited by:

    1. Eguia, Jon X. & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2019. "Tactical Extremism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 282-286, February.
    2. Mirko Draca & Carlo Schwarz, 2024. "How Polarised are Citizens? Measuring Ideology from the Ground up," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 1950-1984.
    3. Sergei Guriev & Elias Papaioannou, 2022. "The Political Economy of Populism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 753-832, September.
    4. Kishishita, Daiki & Yamagishi, Atsushi, 2021. "Contagion of populist extremism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    5. Leyla D. Karakas & Devashish Mitra, 2021. "Electoral competition in the presence of identity politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(2), pages 169-197, April.
    6. Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish, 2020. "Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Robert Gold, 2022. "From a better understanding of the drivers of populism to a new political agenda," Working Papers 4, Forum New Economy.
    8. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2022. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(3), pages 443-477, July.
    9. Tanja Artiga González & Francesco Capozza & Georg D. Granic, 2022. "Can Cognitive Dissonance Theory Explain Action Induced Changes in Political Preferences?," CESifo Working Paper Series 9549, CESifo.
    10. Morelli, Massimo & Gennaro, Gloria & Lecce, Giampaolo, 2021. "Mobilization and the Strategy of Populism Theory and Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 15686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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