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Lobbying (Strategically Appointed) Bureaucrats

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Abstract

When are strategic appointments useful in curbing policy bias from ex-post negotiation between state agencies and special interest groups? Bertelli and Feldmann (Jnl. of Public Admin. Research and Theory, 2007) provide an insightful analysis of the issue within a full information model of presidential appointments. This paper examines whether and how their findings extend to a world of policy uncertainty and asymmetric information, which rationalizes delegation in the first place. We establish that the existence of non-zero impact of lobbying crucially relies on interest groups' leverage over the appointment game between higher-level institutions. Remarkably, bureaucratic lobbying may prove highly non-neutral with separated powers even when a candidate agency is agreed upon. In some circumstances (e.g., recess appointments in the U.S.), by contrast, strategic appointments fully offset interest group influence in either form of government (unified versus divided), a finding in line with the conventional theory of delegation.

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  • Marco M. Sorge, 2014. "Lobbying (Strategically Appointed) Bureaucrats," CSEF Working Papers 380, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:380
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    1. Nayara F. Macedo de Medeiros Albrecht, 2023. "Bureaucrats, interest groups and policymaking: a comprehensive overview from the turn of the century," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislative delegation; Strategic appointments; Bureaucratic lobbying;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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