When the squeakiest wheel gets the most oil: Exploiting one's nuisance power
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DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.06.004
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- Marc Sangnier & Yanos Zylberberg, 2017. "Protests and Trust in the State: Evidence from African Countries," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 17/682, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Marc Sangnier & Yanos Zylberberg, 2017. "Protests and trust in the state: Evidence from African countries," Post-Print hal-01634049, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Lobby group; Union; Political economy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
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