IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rco/dpaper/211.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Are Strategies Anchored?

Author

Listed:
  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta

    (TU Berlin)

  • Seres, Gyula

    (HU Berlin)

Abstract

Anchoring is one of the most studied and robust behavioral biases, but there is little knowledge about its persistence in strategic settings. This article studies the role of anchoring bias in private-value auctions. We test experimentally two different anchor types. The announcement of a random group identification number but also of an upper bid limit in the first-price sealed-bid auction result in higher bids. We show that such behavior can be explained as a rational response to biased beliefs. In Dutch auctions, the effect of a starting price, is negative. We demonstrate that the long-established ranking that the Dutch auction generates lower revenue than the first-price sealed-bid auction crucially depends on the size of the anchor.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Are Strategies Anchored?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 211, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:211
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/211.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Noussair, Charles & Robin, Stephane & Ruffieux, Bernard, 2004. "Revealing consumers' willingness-to-pay: A comparison of the BDM mechanism and the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 725-741, December.
    2. Wolk, Agnieszka & Spann, Martin, 2008. "The effects of reference prices on bidding behavior in interactive pricing mechanisms," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 2-18.
    3. Green, Donald & Jacowitz, Karen E. & Kahneman, Daniel & McFadden, Daniel, 1998. "Referendum contingent valuation, anchoring, and willingness to pay for public goods," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 85-116, June.
    4. Ernan Haruvy & Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc, 2010. "The Impact of Online Auction Duration," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 99-106, March.
    5. Whyte, Glen & Sebenius, James K., 1997. "The Effect of Multiple Anchors on Anchoring in Individual and Group Judgment," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 74-85, January.
    6. Simon Medcalfe, 2016. "Are bidders in auctions anchored by their bidder number?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(8), pages 559-561, May.
    7. Cox, James C. & Smith, Vernon L. & Walker, James M., 1983. "A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2-3), pages 205-219.
    8. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    9. Baghestanian, Sascha & Walker, Todd B., 2015. "Anchoring in experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 15-25.
    10. Holst, Gesa Sophie & Hermann, Daniel & Musshoff, Oliver, 2015. "Anchoring effects in an experimental auction – Are farmers anchored?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 106-117.
    11. R. Andrew Luccasen, 2012. "Anchoring Effects and Participant Numbers: Evidence from a Public Good Game," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 93(3), pages 858-865, September.
    12. David Lucking-Reiley, 1999. "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1063-1080, December.
    13. Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till E., 2015. "Anchoring in social context," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-39.
    14. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    15. Furnham, Adrian & Boo, Hua Chu, 2011. "A literature review of the anchoring effect," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 35-42, February.
    16. Dan Levin & James Peck & Asen Ivanov, 2016. "Separating Bayesian Updating from Non-Probabilistic Reasoning: An Experimental Investigation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 39-60, May.
    17. Bergman, Oscar & Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Svensson, Cicek, 2010. "Anchoring and cognitive ability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 66-68, April.
    18. Holst, G.S. & Hermann, D. & Mußhoff, O., 2015. "Anchoring Effects in an Experimental Auction," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 50, March.
    19. repec:cup:judgdm:v:6:y:2011:i:2:p:139-146 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Trautmann, Stefan T. & Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Reserve prices as reference points - Evidence from auctions for football players at Hattrick.org," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 230-240, April.
    21. Elena Katok & Anthony Kwasnica, 2008. "Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s revenue in Dutch auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(4), pages 344-357, December.
    22. Theodore Turocy & Elizabeth Watson & Raymond Battalio, 2007. "Framing the first-price auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 37-51, March.
    23. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2011. "Out‐Of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1361-1397, December.
    24. Dimitri,Nicola & Piga,Gustavo & Spagnolo,Giancarlo (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Procurement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870733, September.
    25. Bohm, Peter & Linden, Johan & Sonnegard, Joakim, 1997. "Eliciting Reservation Prices: Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanisms vs. Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1079-1089, July.
    26. Ronald Peeters & Martin Strobel & Dries Vermeulen & Markus Walzl, 2016. "The Impact of the Irrelevant: Temporary Buy-Options and Bidding Behavior in Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-19, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2022. "Anchored strategic reasoning," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    2. Rafiq Friperson & Hessel Oosterbeek & Bas van der Klaauw, 2023. "Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-035/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Yigit Oezcelik & Michel Tolksdorf, 2023. "Non-numerical and social anchoring in consumer-generated ratings," Working Papers 202319, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    4. Haruvy, Ernan & Heinrich, Timo & Walker, Matthew J., 2022. "Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2022. "Anchored strategic reasoning," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    2. Tanya O’Garra & Matthew R Sisco, 2020. "The effect of anchors and social information on behaviour," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-19, April.
    3. Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Sarah Taylor & Neslihan Uler, 2012. "Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(2), pages 159-173, September.
    4. Adam, Marc T.P. & Krämer, Jan & Müller, Marius B., 2015. "Auction Fever! How Time Pressure and Social Competition Affect Bidders’ Arousal and Bids in Retail Auctions," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 468-485.
    5. Lukas Meub & Till Proeger, 2018. "Are groups ‘less behavioral’? The case of anchoring," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(2), pages 117-150, August.
    6. Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Rasch, Alexander & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2016. "Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145849, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Wedad J. Elmaghraby & Elena Katok & Natalia Santamaría, 2012. "A Laboratory Investigation of Rank Feedback in Procurement Auctions," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 14(1), pages 128-144, January.
    8. Cary Deck & Bart J. Wilson, 2020. "Auctions in near-continuous time," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 110-126, March.
    9. Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till, 2016. "Are groups 'less behavioral'? The case of anchoring," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 188 [rev.], University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    10. Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till, 2014. "Are groups 'less behavioral'? The case of anchoring," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 188, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    11. Magdalena Brzozowicz & Michał Krawczyk, 2020. "Honey, Mugs and Caricatures: anchors on prices of consumer goods only hold hypothetically," Working Papers 2020-40, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    12. Sascha Füllbrunn & Dirk‐Jan Janssen & Utz Weitzel, 2019. "Risk Aversion And Overbidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions: New Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 631-647, January.
    13. Ciril Bosch-Rosa & Thomas Meissner & Antoni Bosch-Domènech, 2018. "Cognitive bubbles," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(1), pages 132-153, March.
    14. Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till E., 2015. "Anchoring in social context," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-39.
    15. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 407-425, October.
    16. Li, Lunzheng & Maniadis, Zacharias & Sedikides, Constantine, 2021. "Anchoring in Economics: A Meta-Analysis of Studies on Willingness-To-Pay and Willingness-To-Accept," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    17. Jetter, Michael & Walker, Jay K., 2017. "Anchoring in financial decision-making: Evidence from Jeopardy!," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 164-176.
    18. Andrew M. Davis & Elena Katok & Anthony M. Kwasnica, 2014. "Should Sellers Prefer Auctions? A Laboratory Comparison of Auctions and Sequential Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(4), pages 990-1008, April.
    19. Catherine Roux & Christian Thöni, 2015. "Do control questions influence behavior in experiments?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(2), pages 185-194, June.
    20. Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till & Bizer, Kilian, 2013. "Anchoring: A valid explanation for biased forecasts when rational predictions are easily accessible and well incentivized?," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 166, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    anchoring bias; games; incomplete information; auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:211. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Viviana Lalli (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://rationality-and-competition.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.