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Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design

Author

Listed:
  • Cramton Peter

    (University of Maryland)

  • Katzman Brett E

    (Kennesaw State University)

Abstract

Healthcare costs are no doubt too high, and Congress has been pushing for 13 years to harness market forces in Medicare procurement. But despite all this time, we are on the precipice of adopting a very poor market design according to Peter Cramton of University of Maryland and Brett Katzman of Kennewaw State University.

Suggested Citation

  • Cramton Peter & Katzman Brett E, 2010. "Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 1-4, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:7:y:2010:i:4:n:8
    DOI: 10.2202/1553-3832.1802
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Cramton, 2012. "Medicare Auction Failure: Early Evidence from the Round 1 Rebid," Papers of Peter Cramton 11cmaf, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    2. Peter Cramton, 2012. "Medicare Auction Reform," Papers of Peter Cramton 12cmaft, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    3. Peter Cramton, 2012. "Auction Design for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment," Papers of Peter Cramton 11cadm, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    4. Thu Trang Vuong & Ha Nguyen & Quan-Hoang Vuong, 2016. "Health insurance thresholds and policy implications: a Vietnamese medical survey in 2015," Working Papers CEB 16-039, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Quan-Hoang Vuong & Thu Trang Vuong, 2016. "Medical insurance and expenditure thresholds for Vietnamese patient satisfaction with healthcare services," Working Papers CEB 16-041, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Arvate, Paulo Roberto & Barbosa, Klênio & Gambardella, Dante, 2013. "Generic-branded drug competition and the price for pharmaceuticals in procurement auctions," Textos para discussão 333, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    7. Peter Cramton & Ulrich Gall & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta, 2012. "An Auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment: Evidence from an Industry Mock Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 10cgsma, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    8. Andrew Stocking & James Baumgardner & Melinda Buntin & Anna Cook, 2014. "Examining the Number of Competitors and the Cost of Medicare Part D: Working Paper 2014-04," Working Papers 45553, Congressional Budget Office.
    9. Andrew Stocking & James Baumgardner & Melinda Buntin & Anna Cook, 2014. "Assessing the Design of the Low-Income Subsidy Program in Medicare Part D: Working Paper 2014-07," Working Papers 49451, Congressional Budget Office.
    10. Peter Cramton & Sean Ellermeyer & Brett Katzman, 2015. "Designed To Fail: The Medicare Auction For Durable Medical Equipment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 469-485, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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