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Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Coles
  • Alexey Kushnir
  • Muriel Niederle

Abstract

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Coles & Alexey Kushnir & Muriel Niederle, 2010. "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets," NBER Working Papers 16185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16185
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Coles & John Cawley & Phillip B. Levine & Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & John J. Siegfried, 2010. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 187-206, Fall.
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    8. Kushnir, Alexey, 2013. "Harmful signaling in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 209-218.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General

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