Matching Markets with Signals
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- Kushnir, Alexey, 2009. "Matching Markets with Signals," Sustainable Development Papers 50730, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Alexey Kushnir, 2010. "Harmful signaling in matching markets," IEW - Working Papers 509, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Alexey Kushnir, 2010. "Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets," Working Papers 2010.121, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Peter Coles & Alexey Kushnir & Muriel Niederle, 2013.
"Preference Signaling in Matching Markets,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 99-134, May.
- Peter Coles & Alexey Kushnir & Muriel Niederle, 2010. "Preference signaling in matching markets," IEW - Working Papers 508, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Peter Coles & Alexey Kushnir & Muriel Niederle, 2010. "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets," NBER Working Papers 16185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Soohyung Lee & Muriel Niederle, 2015.
"Propose with a rose? Signaling in internet dating markets,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 731-755, December.
- Soohyung Lee, 2010. "Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets," 2010 Meeting Papers 285, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Soohyung Lee & Muriel Niederle & Hye-Rim Kim & Woo-Keum Kim, 2011. "Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets," NBER Working Papers 17340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Horton, John J. & Johari, Ramesh & Kircher, Philipp, 2021. "Cheap Talk Messages for Market Design: Theory and Evidence from a Labor Market with Directed," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Nick Arnosti & Ramesh Johari & Yash Kanoria, 2021. "Managing Congestion in Matching Markets," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 620-636, May.
- Baodong Li & Yu Yang & Jiafu Su & Zhichao Liang & Sheng Wang, 2020. "Two-sided matching decision-making model with hesitant fuzzy preference information for configuring cloud manufacturing tasks and resources," Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Springer, vol. 31(8), pages 2033-2047, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Matching Markets; Signaling;JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2009-07-28 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-28 (Game Theory)
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