IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mub/wpaper/2022-11.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses

Author

Listed:
  • Armenak Antinyan

    (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom and Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China)

  • Luca Corazzini

    (Department of Economics and VERA, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venezia, Italy and MUEEL, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic)

  • Miloš Fišar

    (Competence Center for Experimental Research, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria, MUEEL, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, and Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari, University of Venice, Venezia, Italy)

  • Tommaso Reggiani

    (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, United Kingdom and MUEEL, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, and IZA)

Abstract

There has been an increasing interest in altruistic behaviour in the domain of losses recently. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in whether the monetary losses make individuals more generous or more selfish. Although almost all relevant studies rely on a dictator game to study altruistic behaviour, the experimental designs of these studies differ in how the losses are framed, which may explain the diverging findings. Utilizing a dictator game, this paper studies the impact of loss framing on altruism. The main methodological result is that the dictators’ prosocial behaviour is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. More specifically, in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations of the dictators are more benevolent than in a standard setting without a loss and in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the different social norms that the respective loss frames invoke.

Suggested Citation

  • Armenak Antinyan & Luca Corazzini & Miloš Fišar & Tommaso Reggiani, 2022. "Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2022-11, Masaryk University, revised Feb 2023.
  • Handle: RePEc:mub:wpaper:2022-11
    DOI: 10.5817/WP_MUNI_ECON_2022-11
    Note: License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.econ.muni.cz/mub/wpaper/wp/econ/WP_MUNI_ECON_2022-11.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.5817/WP_MUNI_ECON_2022-11?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John A. List & Azeem M. Shaikh & Yang Xu, 2019. "Multiple hypothesis testing in experimental economics," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(4), pages 773-793, December.
    2. John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(3), pages 482-493.
    3. Todd L. Cherry & Peter Frykblom & Jason F. Shogren, 2002. "Hardnose the Dictator," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1218-1221, September.
    4. repec:bla:ausecr:v:38:y:2005:i:3:p:285-297 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Gary Charness & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "The Dark Side of Competition for Status," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 38-55, January.
    6. Oxoby, Robert J. & Spraggon, John, 2008. "Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 703-713, March.
    7. Anna Dreber & Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson & David Rand, 2013. "Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(3), pages 349-371, September.
    8. Benistant, Julien & Suchon, Rémi, 2021. "It does (not) get better: Reference income violation and altruism," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    9. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara, 2012. "Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 117-130.
    10. Erin L. Krupka & Roberto A. Weber, 2013. "Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 495-524, June.
    11. John A. List, 2011. "The Market for Charitable Giving," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 157-180, Spring.
    12. Robert Dur, 2009. "Gift Exchange in The Workplace: Money or Attention?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 550-560, 04-05.
    13. Abigail Barr & Danila Serra, 2009. "The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 488-503, December.
    14. Erkut, Hande, 2022. "Social norms and preferences for generosity are domain dependent," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 121-140.
    15. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2010. "Social Incentives in the Workplace," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(2), pages 417-458.
    16. Marreiros, Helia & Tonin, Mirco & Vlassopoulos, Michael & Schraefel, M.C., 2017. "“Now that you mention it”: A survey experiment on information, inattention and online privacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 1-17.
    17. Christoph Engel, 2011. "Dictator games: a meta study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(4), pages 583-610, November.
    18. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2006. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 615-691, Elsevier.
    19. François Cochard & Alexandre Flage & Gilles Grolleau & Angela Sutan, 2020. "Are individuals more generous in loss contexts?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 845-866, December.
    20. Steinel, Wolfgang & Valtcheva, Kalina & Gross, Jörg & Celse, Jérémy & Max, Sylvain & Shalvi, Shaul, 2022. "(Dis)honesty in the face of uncertain gains or losses," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    21. Bowles, Samuel & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2008. "Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(8-9), pages 1811-1820, August.
    22. Ofra Amir & David G Rand & Ya'akov Kobi Gal, 2012. "Economic Games on the Internet: The Effect of $1 Stakes," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(2), pages 1-4, February.
    23. Gary Charness & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "The Dark Side of Competition for Status (preprint)," Working Papers halshs-01090241, HAL.
    24. Rotemberg, Julio J., 2006. "Altruism, reciprocity and cooperation in the workplace," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1371-1407, Elsevier.
    25. Nichola J Raihani & Ruth Mace & Shakti Lamba, 2013. "The Effect of $1, $5 and $10 Stakes in an Online Dictator Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(8), pages 1-1, August.
    26. Fiedler, Susann & Hillenbrand, Adrian, 2020. "Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 232-251.
    27. Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, 2002. "Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-take Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 147-169, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Armenak Antinyan & Tigran Aydinyan & Anna Ressi & Lilia Wasserka-Zhurakhovska, 2023. "An Experimental Analysis of In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Discrimination in the Gain and Loss Domain," CESifo Working Paper Series 10606, CESifo.
    2. Valerio Capraro & Roberto Di Paolo & Veronica Pizziol, 2023. "Assessing Large Language Models' ability to predict how humans balance self-interest and the interest of others," Papers 2307.12776, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    3. François Cochard & Alexandre Flage, 2023. "Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis," Working Papers 2023-09, CRESE.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Luca Corazzini & Matteo M. Marini, 2022. "Focal points in multiple threshold public goods games: A single-project meta-analysis," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2022-10, Masaryk University, revised Feb 2023.
    2. Thunström, Linda, 2019. "Preferences for fairness over losses," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    3. Kassas, Bachir & Palma, Marco A., 2019. "Self-serving biases in social norm compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 388-408.
    4. Anna Dreber & Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson & David Rand, 2013. "Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(3), pages 349-371, September.
    5. Cochard, François & Flage, Alexandre, 2024. "Sharing losses in dictator and ultimatum games: A meta-analysis," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    6. François Cochard & Alexandre Flage, 2023. "Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis," Working Papers 2023-09, CRESE.
    7. Eriksen, Kristoffer W. & Fest, Sebastian & Kvaløy, Ola & Dijk, Oege, 2022. "Fair advice," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    8. Armenak Antinyan, 2014. "Loss and Other-Regarding Preferences: Evidence From Dictator Game," Working Papers 03, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    9. Armenak Antinyan & Tigran Aydinyan & Anna Ressi & Lilia Wasserka-Zhurakhovska, 2023. "An Experimental Analysis of In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Discrimination in the Gain and Loss Domain," CESifo Working Paper Series 10606, CESifo.
    10. Kate Farrow & Gilles Grolleau & Lisette Ibanez, 2017. "Designing more effective norm interventions: the role of valence," Post-Print hal-01680539, HAL.
    11. Korenok, Oleg & Millner, Edward L. & Razzolini, Laura, 2018. "Taking aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 397-403.
      • Korenok Oleg & Edward L. Millner & Laura Razzolini, 2017. "Taking Aversion," Working Papers 1702, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
    12. Kun Zhao & Yoshihisa Kashima & Luke D. Smillie, 2018. "From Windfall Sharing to Property Ownership: Prosocial Personality Traits in Giving and Taking Dictator Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-18, May.
    13. Mercer, Antonio Carlos & Póvoa, Angela Cristiane Santos & Pech, Wesley, 2021. "The effect of luck framing on distributional preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(4), pages 320-329.
    14. Sebastian J. Goerg & David Rand & Gari Walkowitz, 2020. "Framing effects in the prisoner’s dilemma but not in the dictator game," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 1-12, June.
    15. repec:cup:judgdm:v:14:y:2019:i:3:p:309-317 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Valerio Capraro & Andrea Vanzo, 2019. "The power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects in the extreme dictator game," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 14(3), pages 309-317, May.
    17. Benistant, Julien & Suchon, Rémi, 2021. "It does (not) get better: Reference income violation and altruism," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    18. Howe, E. Lance & Murphy, James J. & Gerkey, Drew & Stoddard, Olga B. & West, Colin Thor, 2023. "Sharing, social norms, and social distance: Experimental evidence from Russia and Western Alaska," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 213(C), pages 345-358.
    19. Pikulina, Elena S. & Tergiman, Chloe, 2020. "Preferences for power," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    20. François Cochard & Alexandre Flage & Gilles Grolleau & Angela Sutan, 2020. "Are individuals more generous in loss contexts?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 845-866, December.
    21. Marius Alt & Carlo Gallier & Achim Schlüter & Katherine Nelson & Eva Anggraini, 2018. "Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-14, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    loss; framing; altruism; dictator game; experiment; social norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mub:wpaper:2022-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emunicz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.