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Dynamic Many-to-One Matching

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  • Ahmet Altinok

Abstract

We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the followingfeatures: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, eachagent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behaviorin such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matchingmarket in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises: Canwe analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-oneor a dynamic one-to-one market? First, we provide sufficient conditions under which theanswer is yes. Second, we show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchingsare âinferiorâ to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, we extend the model to allow agents onone side to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, we provide arationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the US medical residency matchingmarket compared to the US college-admissions system.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmet Altinok, 2019. "Dynamic Many-to-One Matching," 2019 Papers pal868, Job Market Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmp:jm2019:pal868
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Coles & John Cawley & Phillip B. Levine & Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & John J. Siegfried, 2010. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 187-206, Fall.
    2. Christopher Avery & Jonathan Levin, 2010. "Early Admissions at Selective Colleges," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2125-2156, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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