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Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets

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  • Doval, Laura
  • Schenone, Pablo

Abstract

We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they remain unmatched, which we refer to as the agent’s conjectures. A collection of conjectures, together with a pairwise stability and individual rationality requirement given the conjectures, defines a solution concept for the economy. We identify a sufficient condition — consistency — for a family of conjectures to lead to a nonempty solution (cf. Hafalir, 2008). As an application, we introduce two families of consistent conjectures and their corresponding solution concepts: continuation-value-respecting dynamic stability, and the extension to dynamic markets of the solution concept in Hafalir (2008), sophisticated dynamic stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Doval, Laura & Schenone, Pablo, 2024. "Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 114-127.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:132:y:2024:i:c:p:114-127
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic matching; Matching with externalities; Conjectures; Dynamic stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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