Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology
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- Sebastian J. Goerg & Sebastian Kube & Ro'i Zultan, 2010. "Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation, and Production Technology," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(4), pages 747-772, October.
- Goerg, Sebastian J. & Kube, Sebastian & Zultan, Ro'i, 2007. "Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 17/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
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- Esteban Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan, 2013. "Can Higher Rewards Lead To Less Effort? Incentive Reversal In Teams," Working Papers 1309, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
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- Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele & Sefton, Martin, 2008. "The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 3639, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2010. "The Impact Of Social Comparisons On Reciprocity," Discussion Papers 2010-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2008. "The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity," Discussion Papers 2008-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2010. "The Impact of Social Camparisons of Reciprocity," Discussion Papers 2010-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2008. "The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity," Discussion Papers 2008-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Johannes Abeler & Steffen Altmann & Sebastian Kube & Matthias Wibral, 2010.
"Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness Concerns: When Equality is Unfair,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(6), pages 1299-1324, December.
- Abeler, Johannes & Altmann, Steffen & Kube, Sebastian & Wibral, Matthias, 2009. "Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness Concerns: When Equality Is Unfair," IZA Discussion Papers 4262, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Johannes Abeler & Stefen Altmann & Sebastian Kube & Matthias Wibral, 2009. "Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness Concerns - When Equality Is Unfair," Discussion Papers 2009-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Johannes Abeler & Stefen Altmann & Sebastian Kube & Matthias Wibral, 2009. "Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness Concerns - When Equality Is Unfair," Discussion Papers 2009-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2016. "Testing for the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-Effort Work Task," IZA Discussion Papers 9981, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
More about this item
Keywords
discriminating mechanism; laboratory experiment; social preferences; production function; equity; team incentives; mechanism desig;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2009-02-14 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-02-14 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-LAB-2009-02-14 (Labour Economics)
Statistics
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