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Competing for Influence in Networks through Strategic Targeting

Author

Listed:
  • Comola, Margherita

    (Paris School of Economics)

  • Rusinowska, Agnieszka

    (Paris School of Economics)

  • Villeval, Marie Claire

    (CNRS, GATE)

Abstract

We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes' initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avoid nodes targeted by the opponent. Targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the distribution of initial opinions.

Suggested Citation

  • Comola, Margherita & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2024. "Competing for Influence in Networks through Strategic Targeting," IZA Discussion Papers 17315, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17315
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    network; influence; targeting; competition; laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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