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Group Targeting under Networked Synergies

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Abstract

A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan, 2018. "Group Targeting under Networked Synergies," AMSE Working Papers 1812, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1812
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Allouch, Nizar & King, Maia, 2021. "Welfare targeting in networks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    2. Chukwudi Henry Dike, 2020. "Strategic Interactions in Financial Networks," 2020 Papers pdi579, Job Market Papers.
    3. Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric & Safi, Shahir, 2023. "Targeting in networks under costly agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 154-172.
    4. Bloch, Francis & Shabayek, Shaden, 2023. "Targeting in social networks with anonymized information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 380-402.
    5. Sun, Yang & Zhao, Wei, 2024. "Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 285-311.
    6. Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie & Chen, Ying-Ju, 2021. "The Limit of Targeting in Networks," ISU General Staff Papers 202112081957590000, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan & Shahir Safi, 2020. "Costly agreement-based transfers and targeting on networks with synergies," Working Papers halshs-02558397, HAL.
    8. Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie & Chen, Ying-Ju, 2022. "The limit of targeting in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    9. Thomas J. Sargent & John Stachurski, 2022. "Economic Networks: Theory and Computation," Papers 2203.11972, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    10. Dike Chukwudi Henry, 2021. "Network Games, Peer Effect and Neutral Transfers," Studies in Economics 2107, School of Economics, University of Kent.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    multi-agent contracting; Network; synergies; aggregate effort; optimal group targeting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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