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Entry threats and insufficiency in efficient bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Rupayan Pal

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

  • Bibhas Saha

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

We examine whether the outcome of bargaining over wage and employment between an incumbent firm and a union remains efficient under entry threat. The workers\' reservation wage is not known to the entrant, and entry is profitable only against the high reservation wage. The entrant observes the pre-entry price, but not necessarily the wage agreements. When wage is not observed, contracts feature over-employment. Under separating equilibrium the low type is over-employed, and under pooling equilibrium the high type is over-employed. But when wage is observed, pooling equilibrium may not always exist, and separating equilibrium does not involve any inefficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry threats and insufficiency in efficient bargaining," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2010-016, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    • Handle: RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2010-016
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    File URL: http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2010-016.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficient Bargaining; Entry Threat; Signalling; Inefficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy

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