Lifetime Employment Contract and Strategic Entry Deterrence: Cournot and Bertrand
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DOI: 10.1111/1467-8454.00111
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2008.
"Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 121-147, November.
- Rupayan Pal, 2008. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence:A Reassessment of Limit Pricing," Working Papers id:1375, eSocialSciences.
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2016.
"Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(3), pages 258-277, July.
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry threats and insufficiency in efficient bargaining," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2010-016, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2022. "Socially concerned duopolies with lifetime employment as a strategic commitment," MPRA Paper 111625, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2007. "Wage-Rise Contract and Entry Deterrence: Bertrand and Cournot," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 8(1), pages 155-165, May.
- Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2003. "A Note on the Most‐Favoured‐Customer Pricing Policy," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 407-413, October.
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’," Working Papers id:2833, eSocialSciences.
- Domenico Buccella & Luciano Fanti, 2024.
"A theory of entry dissuasion,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(3), pages 666-684, July.
- Domenico Buccella & Luciano Fanti, 2020. "A theory of entry dissuasion," Discussion Papers 2020/265, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
- Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024. "A labor-managed Bertrand oligopoly game with lifetime employment as a strategic commitment," MPRA Paper 121486, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "Lifetime employment and reaction functions of socially concerned firms under quantity competition," MPRA Paper 110867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2006. "Investment Decisions in a New Mixed Market," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 7(2), pages 271-281, November.
- Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2022. "Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 21(1), pages 27-42, June.
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry Threats, and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’," Labor Economics Working Papers 23020, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2012. "Quantity-setting games with lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment," Philippine Review of Economics, University of the Philippines School of Economics and Philippine Economic Society, vol. 49(2), pages 25-40, December.
- Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2011. "Lifetime employment contract and reaction functions of profit-maximizing and labor-managed firms," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 152-157, September.
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