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Equilibrium Arrival Times to Queues: The Case of Last-Come First-Serve Preemptive-Resume

Author

Listed:
  • Breinbjerg, Jesper

    (Department of Business and Economics)

  • Østerdal, Lars Peter

    (Department of Economics)

Abstract

We consider a non-cooperative queueing environment where a finite number of customers independently choose when to arrive at a queueing system that opens at a given point in time and serves customers on a last-come first-serve preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR) basis. Each customer has a service time requirement which is identically and independently distributed according to some general probability distribution, and they want to complete service as early as possible while minimizing the time spent in the queue. In this setting, we establish the existence of an arrival time strategy that constitutes a symmetric (mixed) Nash equilibrium, and show that there is at most one symmetric equilibrium. We provide a numerical method to compute this equilibrium and demonstrate by a numerical example that the social efficiency can be lower than the efficiency induced by a similar queueing system that serves customers on a first-come first-serve (FCFS) basis.

Suggested Citation

  • Breinbjerg, Jesper & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Equilibrium Arrival Times to Queues: The Case of Last-Come First-Serve Preemptive-Resume," Discussion Papers on Economics 3/2017, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2017_003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Breinbjerg, Jesper, 2017. "Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(2), pages 595-605.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Queueing; strategic arrival times to a queue; non-cooperative games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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