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What’s in a Name? - An ethnical discrimination experiment

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This paper presents the results from an ethnical discrimination experiment that was conducted in one of Sweden’s most “problematic” cities with respect to the integration process of refugees. The subjects confronted three different bargaining games; one trust game, one social exclusion and coalition formation game; and one battle of the sexes game. No general discrimination effect was detected. However, one specific effect was that Non-Swedes were less likely to be chosen as bargaining partners in the coalition formation game. Another specific effect was found in the males’ trust and ultimatum responses; Non-Swedes had higher returns on being generous compared to Swedes.

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  • Holm, Håkan, 2000. "What’s in a Name? - An ethnical discrimination experiment," Working Papers 2000:3, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 16 Apr 2001.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2000_003
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    Cited by:

    1. Olof Åslund & Oskar Nordströum Skans, 2012. "Do Anonymous Job Application Procedures Level the Playing Field?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 65(1), pages 82-107, January.
    2. Abigail Barr, 2004. "Rational and Biased Trust," Development and Comp Systems 0409068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Gerhard Riener & Alexander Schacht, 2011. "Group Identity and Discrimination in Small Markets: Asymmetry of In-Group Favors," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-043, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; ethnical discrimination; experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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